Tadle

Tadle
DeFiFoundry
27,750 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Mismatch between code implementation and developer comment in offer status check in DeliveryPlace::closeBidOffer() function

Vulnerability Details

There is a discrepancy between the actual code implementation and the developer's comment regarding the required offer status in DeliveryPlace::closeBidOffer() function. The code checks for OfferStatus.Virgin, but the comment indicates that the status should be Settling. This mismatch could lead to the function behaving in ways not intended by the developers, potentially causing serious issues in the contract's logic flow.

[Dev comment here:](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/DeliveryPlace.sol#L32)

@dev offer status must be Settling

[Link to code here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/DeliveryPlace.sol#L58-L60)

if (offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Virgin) {
revert InvalidOfferStatus();
}

Impact

This discrepancy could lead to function calls succeeding or failing unexpectedly.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-PreMarkets-closeBidOffer-Virgin-Settling

Based on the current Tadle market system, the `Settling` status is never used (along with `Ongoing` and `Filled`), which is supposed to represent the state before settlement by original maker. While sementically, the `Virgin` status does not represent the correct phase to allow early closures before settlement, this issue does not have any current impact given technically the early closure of bid offers is still allowed. However, if we are basing it off of the correct status implementation (i.e. `Settling` phase appropriately updated when takers create offers), then the DoS will occur, essentially blocking any early closure of bids by subsequent makers, forcing them to follow through to final settlement. Unfortunately, none of these issues identify the correct pre-context mentioned above, but I believe medium severity is appropriate. Note for downgrade to low severity: Agree with above appeals and low severity, this is more of a status accounting error and does not have any impact, given the function of `closeBidOffer` is to withdraw the unused portion of sales proceeds. It can be executed as long as the TGE time has been reached, and it restricts the offer to be in a Virgin state. Since the statuses consistently do not utilize a switch from Vigin to Ongoing/Filled and the protocol can function appropriately even without the use of such statuses (presuming other bugs are fixed), the DoS impact will not occur.

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