Tadle

Tadle
DeFiFoundry
27,750 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Referral system doesn't work as intended

Vulnerability details

When user creates a taker the referral code will be used if user had it set up.

Code from createTaker:

ReferralInfo memory referralInfo = systemConfig.getReferralInfo(
_msgSender()
);

We can see that we pass _msgSender() into getReferralInfo to get user's referral info.

Let's take a look how user's referral info is set up.

User calls updateReferrerInfo inside SystemConfing to set up his info. He passes a referrer, referrerRate and authority rate. Referrer is an address that the user get's the code from. The issue is that, the referralInfoMap is initialized with _referrer parameter, not msg.sender. It means that getReferralInfo with msg.sender will not work correctly as it wasn't correctly initialized in updateReferrerInfo.

function updateReferrerInfo(
address _referrer,
uint256 _referrerRate,
uint256 _authorityRate
) external {
if (_msgSender() == _referrer) {
revert InvalidReferrer(_referrer);
}
if (_referrer == address(0x0)) {
revert Errors.ZeroAddress();
}
if (_referrerRate < baseReferralRate) {
revert InvalidReferrerRate(_referrerRate);
}
uint256 referralExtraRate = referralExtraRateMap[_referrer];
uint256 totalRate = baseReferralRate + referralExtraRate;
if (totalRate > Constants.REFERRAL_RATE_DECIMAL_SCALER) {
revert InvalidTotalRate(totalRate);
}
if (_referrerRate + _authorityRate != totalRate) {
revert InvalidRate(_referrerRate, _authorityRate, totalRate);
}
ReferralInfo storage referralInfo = referralInfoMap[_referrer];
referralInfo.referrer = _referrer;
referralInfo.referrerRate = _referrerRate;
referralInfo.authorityRate = _authorityRate;
emit UpdateReferrerInfo(
msg.sender,
_referrer,
_referrerRate,
_authorityRate
);
}

ReferralInfo storage referralInfo = referralInfoMap[_referrer];

Should be set as:

ReferralInfo storage referralInfo = referralInfoMap[msg.sender];

Then getReferralInfo will work for msg.sender.

ReferralInfo memory referralInfo = systemConfig.getReferralInfo(
_msgSender()
);

Proof of Concept

Create new solidity test and paste the code. Run forge test --match-contract "Playground" -vvv.

At the end there is an assertion which ensures that user (referrer) did not receive any referral bonus eventhough the user2 set him up as a referrer.

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
import {Test, console2} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {SystemConfig} from "../src/core/SystemConfig.sol";
import {CapitalPool} from "../src/core/CapitalPool.sol";
import {TokenManager} from "../src/core/TokenManager.sol";
import {PreMarktes} from "../src/core/PreMarkets.sol";
import {DeliveryPlace} from "../src/core/DeliveryPlace.sol";
import {TadleFactory} from "../src/factory/TadleFactory.sol";
import {OfferStatus, StockStatus, AbortOfferStatus, OfferType, StockType, OfferSettleType} from "../src/storage/OfferStatus.sol";
import {IPerMarkets, OfferInfo, StockInfo, MakerInfo, CreateOfferParams} from "../src/interfaces/IPerMarkets.sol";
import {TokenBalanceType, ITokenManager} from "../src/interfaces/ITokenManager.sol";
import {GenerateAddress} from "../src/libraries/GenerateAddress.sol";
import {MockERC20Token} from "./mocks/MockERC20Token.sol";
import {WETH9} from "./mocks/WETH9.sol";
import {UpgradeableProxy} from "../src/proxy/UpgradeableProxy.sol";
contract Playground is Test {
SystemConfig systemConfig;
CapitalPool capitalPool;
TokenManager tokenManager;
PreMarktes preMarktes;
DeliveryPlace deliveryPlace;
address marketPlace;
WETH9 weth9;
MockERC20Token mockUSDCToken;
MockERC20Token mockPointToken;
address user = vm.addr(1);
address user1 = vm.addr(2);
address user2 = vm.addr(3);
address user3 = vm.addr(4);
uint256 basePlatformFeeRate = 5_000;
uint256 baseReferralRate = 300_000;
bytes4 private constant INITIALIZE_OWNERSHIP_SELECTOR =
bytes4(keccak256(bytes("initializeOwnership(address)")));
function setUp() public {
// deploy mocks
weth9 = new WETH9();
TadleFactory tadleFactory = new TadleFactory(user1);
mockUSDCToken = new MockERC20Token();
mockPointToken = new MockERC20Token();
SystemConfig systemConfigLogic = new SystemConfig();
CapitalPool capitalPoolLogic = new CapitalPool();
TokenManager tokenManagerLogic = new TokenManager();
PreMarktes preMarktesLogic = new PreMarktes();
DeliveryPlace deliveryPlaceLogic = new DeliveryPlace();
bytes memory deploy_data = abi.encodeWithSelector(
INITIALIZE_OWNERSHIP_SELECTOR,
user1
);
vm.startPrank(user1);
address systemConfigProxy = tadleFactory.deployUpgradeableProxy(
1,
address(systemConfigLogic),
bytes(deploy_data)
);
address preMarktesProxy = tadleFactory.deployUpgradeableProxy(
2,
address(preMarktesLogic),
bytes(deploy_data)
);
address deliveryPlaceProxy = tadleFactory.deployUpgradeableProxy(
3,
address(deliveryPlaceLogic),
bytes(deploy_data)
);
address capitalPoolProxy = tadleFactory.deployUpgradeableProxy(
4,
address(capitalPoolLogic),
bytes(deploy_data)
);
address tokenManagerProxy = tadleFactory.deployUpgradeableProxy(
5,
address(tokenManagerLogic),
bytes(deploy_data)
);
vm.stopPrank();
// attach logic
systemConfig = SystemConfig(systemConfigProxy);
capitalPool = CapitalPool(capitalPoolProxy);
tokenManager = TokenManager(tokenManagerProxy);
preMarktes = PreMarktes(preMarktesProxy);
deliveryPlace = DeliveryPlace(deliveryPlaceProxy);
vm.startPrank(user1);
// initialize
systemConfig.initialize(basePlatformFeeRate, baseReferralRate);
tokenManager.initialize(address(weth9));
address[] memory tokenAddressList = new address[](2);
tokenAddressList[0] = address(mockUSDCToken);
tokenAddressList[1] = address(weth9);
tokenManager.updateTokenWhiteListed(tokenAddressList, true);
// create market place
systemConfig.createMarketPlace("Backpack", false);
vm.stopPrank();
deal(address(mockUSDCToken), user, 100000000 * 10 ** 18);
deal(address(mockPointToken), user, 100000000 * 10 ** 18);
deal(user, 100000000 * 10 ** 18);
deal(address(mockUSDCToken), user1, 100000000 * 10 ** 18);
deal(address(mockUSDCToken), user2, 100000000 * 10 ** 18);
deal(address(mockUSDCToken), user3, 100000000 * 10 ** 18);
deal(address(mockPointToken), user2, 100000000 * 10 ** 18);
marketPlace = GenerateAddress.generateMarketPlaceAddress("Backpack");
vm.warp(1719826275);
vm.prank(user);
mockUSDCToken.approve(address(tokenManager), type(uint256).max);
vm.startPrank(user2);
mockUSDCToken.approve(address(tokenManager), type(uint256).max);
mockPointToken.approve(address(tokenManager), type(uint256).max);
vm.stopPrank();
}
function testReferralSetup() public {
vm.prank(user2);
systemConfig.updateReferrerInfo(address(user), 300_000, 0);
vm.prank(user);
preMarktes.createOffer(
CreateOfferParams(
marketPlace,
address(mockUSDCToken),
1000,
1 ether,
10000,
300,
OfferType.Ask,
OfferSettleType.Protected
)
);
vm.startPrank(user2);
address offerAddr = GenerateAddress.generateOfferAddress(0);
preMarktes.createTaker(offerAddr, 100);
uint256 userTokenBalance = tokenManager.userTokenBalanceMap(
user,
address(mockUSDCToken),
TokenBalanceType.ReferralBonus
);
// user address will not receive any bonus eventhough user2 set up his as referrer
assertEq(userTokenBalance, 0);
}
}

Impact

Referrer will not receive his referrer bouns which means loss of funds for the referrer.

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Change updateReferrerInfo to:

function updateReferrerInfo(
address _referrer,
uint256 _referrerRate,
uint256 _authorityRate
) external {
if (_msgSender() == _referrer) {
revert InvalidReferrer(_referrer);
}
if (_referrer == address(0x0)) {
revert Errors.ZeroAddress();
}
if (_referrerRate < baseReferralRate) {
revert InvalidReferrerRate(_referrerRate);
}
uint256 referralExtraRate = referralExtraRateMap[_referrer];
uint256 totalRate = baseReferralRate + referralExtraRate;
if (totalRate > Constants.REFERRAL_RATE_DECIMAL_SCALER) {
revert InvalidTotalRate(totalRate);
}
if (_referrerRate + _authorityRate != totalRate) {
revert InvalidRate(_referrerRate, _authorityRate, totalRate);
}
- ReferralInfo storage referralInfo = referralInfoMap[_referrer];
+ ReferralInfo storage referralInfo = referralInfoMap[msg.sender];
referralInfo.referrer = _referrer;
referralInfo.referrerRate = _referrerRate;
referralInfo.authorityRate = _authorityRate;
emit UpdateReferrerInfo(
msg.sender,
_referrer,
_referrerRate,
_authorityRate
);
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-SystemConfig-updateReferrerInfo-msgSender

Valid high severity. There are two impacts here due to the wrong setting of the `refferalInfoMap` mapping. 1. Wrong refferal info is always set, so the refferal will always be delegated to the refferer address instead of the caller 2. Anybody can arbitrarily change the referrer and referrer rate of any user, resulting in gaming of the refferal system I prefer #1500 description the most, be cause it seems to be the only issue although without a poc to fully describe all of the possible impacts

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