https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/main/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L19-L39
The natspec for CapitalPool::approve function says:
@notice only can be called by token manager
However, there are no access control checks for the same.
As it can be seen anyone can approve tokens on behal
Likelihood: High
Impact: Low - Max approval for transfer of any token from the CapitalPool can be given to the TokenManager.
Overall severity is low.
Manual Review
Check if the msg.sender is TokenManager
This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.
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