Tadle

Tadle
DeFiFoundry
27,750 USDC
View results
Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

[L-1] Anyone can call `CapitalPool::approve` function and given

Relevant Links

https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/main/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L19-L39

Summary

The natspec for CapitalPool::approve function says:

@notice only can be called by token manager
However, there are no access control checks for the same.

Vulnerability Details

As it can be seen anyone can approve tokens on behal

/**
* @dev Approve token for token manager
* @notice only can be called by token manager
* @param tokenAddr address of token
*/
function approve(address tokenAddr) external {
address tokenManager = tadleFactory.relatedContracts(
RelatedContractLibraries.TOKEN_MANAGER
);
(bool success, ) = tokenAddr.call(
abi.encodeWithSelector(
APPROVE_SELECTOR,
tokenManager,
type(uint256).max
)
);
if (!success) {
revert ApproveFailed();
}
}

Impact

Likelihood: High
Impact: Low - Max approval for transfer of any token from the CapitalPool can be given to the TokenManager.

Overall severity is low.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Check if the msg.sender is TokenManager

function approve(address tokenAddr) external {
address tokenManager = tadleFactory.relatedContracts(
RelatedContractLibraries.TOKEN_MANAGER
);
+ require(msg.sender == tokenManager);
(bool success, ) = tokenAddr.call(
abi.encodeWithSelector(
APPROVE_SELECTOR,
tokenManager,
type(uint256).max
)
);
if (!success) {
revert ApproveFailed();
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-CapitalPool-approve-missing-access-control

This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!