Tadle
Tadle
DeFiFoundry
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

`TokenManager::tillIn` does not return excessive funds

y4y

Summary

TokenManager::tillIn is a payable function, which accepts WETH as depositing ERC20, the function takes msg.value and wraps them to WETH, but in the case of excessive values, those are not refunded to user.

Vulnerability Details

tillIn accepts Ethers, and deposit required amount to WETH for further token transfer:

function tillIn(
address _accountAddress,
address _tokenAddress,
uint256 _amount,
bool _isPointToken
)
external
payable
onlyRelatedContracts(tadleFactory, _msgSender())
onlyInTokenWhiteList(_isPointToken, _tokenAddress)
{
/// @notice return if amount is 0
if (_amount == 0) {
return;
}
​
address capitalPoolAddr = tadleFactory.relatedContracts(
RelatedContractLibraries.CAPITAL_POOL
);
if (capitalPoolAddr == address(0x0)) {
revert Errors.ContractIsNotDeployed();
}
​
if (_tokenAddress == wrappedNativeToken) {
/**
* @dev token is native token
* @notice check msg value
* @dev if msg value is less than _amount, revert
* @dev wrap native token and transfer to capital pool
*/
if (msg.value < _amount) {
revert Errors.NotEnoughMsgValue(msg.value, _amount);
}
IWrappedNativeToken(wrappedNativeToken).deposit{value: _amount}();
_safe_transfer(wrappedNativeToken, capitalPoolAddr, _amount);
} else {
/// @notice token is ERC20 token
_transfer(
_tokenAddress,
_accountAddress,
capitalPoolAddr,
_amount,
capitalPoolAddr
);
}
​
emit TillIn(_accountAddress, _tokenAddress, _amount, _isPointToken);
}

But in the case which msg.value > amount, the excessive amounts are not refunded back to user, causing loss of funds.

Impact

Potential loss of funds for users.

Tools Used

Manual review

Recommendations

Return the excessive funds, or require msg.value == amount

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Known issue
Assigned finding tags:

[invalid] finding-TokenManager-tillin-excess

Invalid, these are by default, invalid based on codehawks [general guidelines](https://docs.codehawks.com/hawks-auditors/how-to-determine-a-finding-validity#findings-that-may-be-invalid). The check implemented is simply a sufficiency check, it is users responsibility to only send an appropriate amount of native tokens where amount == msg.value when native token is intended to be used as collateral (which will subsequently be deposited as wrapped token). All excess ETH can be rescued using the `Rescuable.sol` contract. > Users sending ETH/native tokens > If contracts allow users to send tokens acc111identally.

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