The CapitalPool::approve function lacks proper access control, allowing any address to call it instead of restricting access to the TokenManager contract only.
The approve function in the CapitalPool contract does not implement any access control checks. This allows any external actor to call the function and potentially approve spending of the CapitalPool's tokens.
Unauthorized approvals of CapitalPool's tokens.
Potential loss of funds if combined with other vulnerabilities.
Violation of the principle of least privilege.
Foundry
Implement access control to restrict the approve function to the TokenManager only:
This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.