The TokenManager::withdraw function does not automatically call CapitalPool::approve, potentially preventing users from withdrawing funds from CapitalPool. This issue becomes critical once CapitalPool::approve access control is correctly restricted to be called only by TokenManager.
CapitalPool::approve should only be callable by TokenManager for security reasons.
TokenManager::withdraw uses Rescuable::_safe_transfer_from without ensuring sufficient allowance or increasing it.
Users will be unable to withdraw their funds until the owner of TokenManager manually calls CapitalPool::approve on that asset
This can lead to locked funds and user frustration, especially in time-sensitive situations.
It introduces a centralization risk, as withdrawals become dependent on manual intervention.
Foundry
Implement an automatic approval mechanism in TokenManager::withdraw:
This issue's severity has similar reasonings to #252, whereby If we consider the correct permissioned implementation for the `approve()` function within `CapitalPool.sol`, this would be a critical severity issue, because the withdrawal of funds will be permanently blocked and must be rescued by the admin via the `Rescuable.sol` contract, given it will always revert [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L36-L38) when attempting to call a non-existent function selector `approve` within the TokenManager contract. Similarly, the argument here is the approval function `approve` was made permisionless, so if somebody beforehand calls approval for the TokenManager for the required token, the transfer will infact not revert when a withdrawal is invoked. I will leave open for escalation discussions, but based on my first point, I believe high severity is appropriate. It also has a slightly different root cause and fix whereby an explicit approval needs to be provided before a call to `_safe_transfer_from()`, if not, the alternative `_transfer()` function should be used to provide an approval, assuming a fix was implemented for issue #252
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