The admin from Tadle can disable a market at any time without any restriction.
The problem here is that all the operations from the PreMarket including closeOffer
(one of the actions that makers can take to rescue their funds) are dependent on the market status == online
.
Basically disabling a market with active makers/takers will cause DoS to withdraw the funds of those users.
i.e: closeOffer
the function responsible to prepare the collateral to be withdrawn:
The protocol will block users from withdrawing their funds. All the collateral will get locked into the protocol.
The locked funds combined with the function rescue
put the trust in the protocol at risk. Explanation below:
Basically, it gives authority to the protocol to lock the funds and withdraw all the tokens deposited by the users. As the rescue
function gives the possibility to withdraw any amount at any time.
Manual Review
Users from disabled markets should be able to close their offers and withdraw their funds.
Consider adding a verification to check whether the market meets the criteria to be disabled.(i.e: doesn't have any pending offers)
The following issues and its duplicates are invalid as admin errors/input validation/malicious intents are1 generally considered invalid based on [codehawks guidelines](https://docs.codehawks.com/hawks-auditors/how-to-determine-a-finding-validity#findings-that-may-be-invalid). If they deploy/set inputs of the contracts appropriately, there will be no issue. Additionally admins are trusted as noted in READ.ME they can break certain assumption of the code based on their actions, and
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