Tadle
Tadle
DeFiFoundry
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Invalid

Dangerous strict equalities operation in DeliveryPlace::settleAskMaker, this leads to logical error in calculations

emma77

Summary

DeliveryPlace::settleAskMaker implementation has a line of code that executes a Dangerous strict equalities:

@> if (offerInfo.offerType == OfferType.Bid) { // @audit Dangerous strict equalities
revert InvalidOfferType(OfferType.Ask, OfferType.Bid);
}

Vulnerability Details

function settleAskMaker(address _offer, uint256 _settledPoints) external {
(
OfferInfo memory offerInfo,
MakerInfo memory makerInfo,
MarketPlaceInfo memory marketPlaceInfo,
MarketPlaceStatus status
) = getOfferInfo(_offer);
​
if (_settledPoints > offerInfo.usedPoints) {
revert InvalidPoints();
}
​
if (marketPlaceInfo.fixedratio) {
revert FixedRatioUnsupported();
}
​
@> if (offerInfo.offerType == OfferType.Bid) { // @audit Dangerous strict equalities
revert InvalidOfferType(OfferType.Ask, OfferType.Bid);
}
​
if (
offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Virgin &&
offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Canceled
) {
revert InvalidOfferStatus();
}
​
@> if (status == MarketPlaceStatus.AskSettling) { // @audit Dangerous strict equalities
if (_msgSender() != offerInfo.authority) {
revert Errors.Unauthorized();
}
} else {
if (_msgSender() != owner()) {
revert Errors.Unauthorized();
}
if (_settledPoints > 0) {
revert InvalidPoints();
}
}
​
uint256 settledPointTokenAmount = marketPlaceInfo.tokenPerPoint *
_settledPoints;
​
ITokenManager tokenManager = tadleFactory.getTokenManager();
if (settledPointTokenAmount > 0) {
tokenManager.tillIn(
_msgSender(),
marketPlaceInfo.tokenAddress,
settledPointTokenAmount,
true
);
}
​
uint256 makerRefundAmount;
@> if (_settledPoints == offerInfo.usedPoints) { // @audit Dangerous strict equalities
@> if (offerInfo.offerStatus == OfferStatus.Virgin) { // @audit Dangerous strict equalities
makerRefundAmount = OfferLibraries.getDepositAmount(
offerInfo.offerType,
offerInfo.collateralRate,
offerInfo.amount,
true,
Math.Rounding.Floor
);
} else {
uint256 usedAmount = offerInfo.amount.mulDiv(
offerInfo.usedPoints,
offerInfo.points,
Math.Rounding.Floor
);
​
makerRefundAmount = OfferLibraries.getDepositAmount(
offerInfo.offerType,
offerInfo.collateralRate,
usedAmount,
true,
Math.Rounding.Floor
);
}
​
tokenManager.addTokenBalance(
TokenBalanceType.SalesRevenue,
_msgSender(),
makerInfo.tokenAddress,
makerRefundAmount
);
}
​
IPerMarkets perMarkets = tadleFactory.getPerMarkets();
perMarkets.settledAskOffer(
_offer,
_settledPoints,
settledPointTokenAmount
);
​
emit SettleAskMaker(
makerInfo.marketPlace,
offerInfo.maker,
_offer,
_msgSender(),
_settledPoints,
settledPointTokenAmount,
makerRefundAmount
);
}

Impact

This leads to error in calculation and an attacker can use this to exploit the protocol to drain funds/assets

Tools Used

manual review

Recommendations

Be Flexible with Conditions,

Avoid overly strict conditions that can’t be reasonably met within the blockchain’s constraints.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge
about 1 year ago
0xnevi Lead Judge about 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Incorrect statement

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