Tadle

Tadle
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

`PreMarkets::createTaker` function can only be created for `Virgin` offer, prevents multiple takers for the same offer

Summary

The PreMarkets::createTaker function only allows interaction with offers in Virgin status, effectively limiting each offer to a single taker. This behavior contradicts the existence of an Ongoing state in the OfferStatus::OfferStatus enum.

Vulnerability Details

The createTaker function only allows interactions with Virgin offers:

function createTaker(address _offer, uint256 _points) external payable {
// ...
OfferInfo storage offerInfo = offerInfoMap[_offer];
if (offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Virgin) {
revert InvalidOfferStatus();
}
}

The OfferStatus enum defines multiple states, including Ongoing:

/**
* @dev Offer status
* @notice Unknown, Virgin, Ongoing, Canceled, Filled, Settling, Settled
* @param Unknown offer not yet exist.
* @param Virgin offer has been listed, but not one trade.
* @param Ongoing offer has been listed, and already one trade.
* @param Canceled offer has been canceled.
* @param Filled offer has been filled.
* @param Settling offer is settling.
* @param Settled offer has been settled, the last status.
*/
enum OfferStatus {
Unknown,
Virgin,
Ongoing,
Canceled,
Filled,
Settling,
Settled
}

The points tracking mechanism in PreMarkets::createTaker function shows that protocol allows multiple takers to interact with a single offer.

PreMarktes::createTaker function:

function createTaker(address _offer, uint256 _points) external payable {
...
if (offerInfo.points < _points + offerInfo.usedPoints) {
revert NotEnoughPoints(
offerInfo.points,
offerInfo.usedPoints,
_points
);
}
...
}

Impact

The limitation to a single taker per offer contradicts the existence of the Ongoing state in the OfferStatus enum. Taker will not be able to create another taker for the same offer, preventing the offer to be fully filled.

Tools Used

  • Manual review

  • Foundry

Recommendations

Update the createTaker function to allow interactions with offers in the Ongoing state:

function createTaker(address _offer, uint256 _points) external payable {
...
- if (offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Virgin) {
+ if (offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Virgin && offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Ongoing) {
revert InvalidOfferStatus();
}
...
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge about 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-PreMarkets-createTaker-Ongoing-Status

The reason for severity for this issue and duplicates are very similar to issue #1164. However, in this case, the issues correctly identified that offer statuses should be updated accordingly based on points transaction (partially filled orders = `Ongoing`, fully filled orders = `Filled`). There is currently no impact on the tadle system since the above two statuses are unused, and while sementically `Virgin` status is not the correct status representing whether taker orders can be created agains maker offers, it can still be performed without a DoS. However, if we are basing it off of the correct status implementation (i.e. `Ongoing` phase appropriately updated when takers create taker offers), then the DoS will occur, essentially blocking any taker offers from being created by subsequent takers for partially filled orders. All issues that does not mention the DoS impact will be low severity, since they still correctly highlighted the wrong status accounting. All issues that mention the possible bypass of `Virgin` status is incorrect, because the usedPoint checks will always ensure points are filled only up to the points posted for offer as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/PreMarkets.sol#L180-L186). Note for downgrade to low severity: Agree with appeals and low severity, this is more of a status accounting error and does not have any impact, since the statuses consistently do not utilize a switch from Vigin to Ongoing/Filled and the protocol can function appropriately even without the use of such statuses (presuming other bugs are fixed), the DoS impact will not occur.

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