The tillIn()
function transfers tokens to a capital pool. However, the internal _transfer()
function does not account for tokens that charge a fee on transfer. This leads to an erroneous balance check, causing the transaction to revert even when the transfer is successful but includes a fee.
The tillIn()
function handles token transfers to a capital pool, distinguishing between native tokens and ERC20 tokens. When handling ERC20 tokens, it calls the internal _transfer()
function:
The vulnerability lies in the _transfer
function's balance checks. It assumes that the amount transferred will be exactly equal to the amount deducted from the sender and added to the recipient. This assumption fails for tokens that charge a transfer fee (e.g., STA, PAXG), as the balance added to the recipient will be less than the amount deducted from the sender.
For tokens that charge a transfer fee, the balance check will fail, causing the transaction to revert. This results in a denial of service (DoS) for users attempting to transfer such tokens, as the contract does not accommodate the fee-on-transfer mechanism.
Manual
To address this issue, the balance checks should be modified to accommodate tokens that charge a transfer fee. Instead of directly comparing the expected balance changes, the function should verify that the recipient received at least the minimum expected amount.
Valid medium, there are disruptions to the ability to take market actions. The following functions will be disrupted without the possibiliy of reaching settlement, since the respective offers cannot be created/listed regardless of mode when transferring collateral token required to the CapitalPool contract or when refunding token from user to capital pool during relisting. So withdrawal is not an issue - `createOffer()` - reverts [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/PreMarkets.sol#L96-L102) - `listOffer()` - reverts [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/PreMarkets.sol#L355-L362) - `relistOffer()` - reverts [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/PreMarkets.sol#L515-L521) - `createTaker()` - reverts [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/PreMarkets.sol#L831-L836) I believe medium severity is appropriate although the likelihood is high and impact is medium (only some level of disruption i.e. FOT tokens not supported and no funds at risk)
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.