Tadle
Tadle
DeFi
30,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Anyone can call the `CapitalPool::approve()` function for authorization.

joicygiore

Summary

Anyone can call the CapitalPool::approve() function for authorization.

Vulnerability Details

The CapitalPool::approve() function comment states that it can only be called by the token manager, but in reality, anyone can call this function to perform authorization.

/**
* @dev Approve token for token manager
@> * @notice only can be called by token manager
* @param tokenAddr address of token
*/
function approve(address tokenAddr) external {
address tokenManager = tadleFactory.relatedContracts(
RelatedContractLibraries.TOKEN_MANAGER
);
(bool success, ) = tokenAddr.call(
abi.encodeWithSelector(
APPROVE_SELECTOR,
tokenManager,
type(uint256).max
)
);
​
​
if (!success) {
revert ApproveFailed();
}
}

Code Snippet

https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L19-L39

Impact

Anyone can call the CapitalPool::approve() function for authorization.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Add appropriate permission control to the CapitalPool::approve() function.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge 10 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-CapitalPool-approve-missing-access-control

This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.

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