The access control for CapitalPool's approve function is not consistent with the comment.
The approve
function in the CapitalPool contract lacks proper access control. While the function comment indicates that it "only can be called by token manager", there is no implementation to enforce this restriction. This allows any external account to call the function, potentially leading to unauthorized token approvals.
Unexpected token approval for tokenManager
, which can be dangerous when tokenManager
contract is compromised.
Manual
Implement proper access control for the approve
function based on design.
This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.
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