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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Checking wrong value of offer status in `DeliveryPlace::closeBidOffer` function, which causes misunderstanding

0xrolko

Relevant GitHub Links

https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/DeliveryPlace.sol#L32

https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/DeliveryPlace.sol#L58

Summary

The advertised value in the documentation for the offer status variable is not the one implemented in the DeliveryPlace::closeBidOffer function.

Vulnerability Details

In the DeliveryPlace::closeBidOffer function, the documentation specifies that OfferStatus must have the value Settling, however the revert condition is applied to the Virgin.

/**
* @notice Close bid offer
* @dev caller must be offer authority
* @dev offer type must Bid
@> * @dev offer status must be Settling
* @dev refund amount = offer amount - used amount
*/
function closeBidOffer(address _offer) external {
​
...
​
@> if (offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Virgin) {
revert InvalidOfferStatus();
}
​
...
​
emit CloseBidOffer(
makerInfo.marketPlace,
offerInfo.maker,
_offer,
_msgSender()
);
}

Impact

The status of the offer will change directly from Virgin to Settled.

And if the status of the offer passed as a parameter in the DeliveryPlace::closeBidOffer function is equal to Settling, the offer will never be closed because the function will always revert.

Tools Used

Manual Analysis.

Recommendations

Change code function as follows:

/**
* @notice Close bid offer
* @dev caller must be offer authority
* @dev offer type must Bid
* @dev offer status must be Settling
* @dev refund amount = offer amount - used amount
*/
function closeBidOffer(address _offer) external {
(
OfferInfo memory offerInfo,
MakerInfo memory makerInfo,
,
MarketPlaceStatus status
) = getOfferInfo(_offer);
​
if (_msgSender() != offerInfo.authority) {
revert Errors.Unauthorized();
}
​
if (offerInfo.offerType == OfferType.Ask) {
revert InvalidOfferType(OfferType.Bid, OfferType.Ask);
}
​
if (
status != MarketPlaceStatus.AskSettling &&
status != MarketPlaceStatus.BidSettling
) {
revert InvaildMarketPlaceStatus();
}
- if (offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Virgin) {
+ if (offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Settling) {
revert InvalidOfferStatus();
}
​
uint256 refundAmount = OfferLibraries.getRefundAmount(
offerInfo.offerType,
offerInfo.amount,
offerInfo.points,
offerInfo.usedPoints,
offerInfo.collateralRate
);
​
ITokenManager tokenManager = tadleFactory.getTokenManager();
tokenManager.addTokenBalance(
TokenBalanceType.MakerRefund,
_msgSender(),
makerInfo.tokenAddress,
refundAmount
);
​
IPerMarkets perMarkets = tadleFactory.getPerMarkets();
perMarkets.updateOfferStatus(_offer, OfferStatus.Settled);
​
emit CloseBidOffer(
makerInfo.marketPlace,
offerInfo.maker,
_offer,
_msgSender()
);
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge 10 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-PreMarkets-closeBidOffer-Virgin-Settling

Based on the current Tadle market system, the `Settling` status is never used (along with `Ongoing` and `Filled`), which is supposed to represent the state before settlement by original maker. While sementically, the `Virgin` status does not represent the correct phase to allow early closures before settlement, this issue does not have any current impact given technically the early closure of bid offers is still allowed. However, if we are basing it off of the correct status implementation (i.e. `Settling` phase appropriately updated when takers create offers), then the DoS will occur, essentially blocking any early closure of bids by subsequent makers, forcing them to follow through to final settlement. Unfortunately, none of these issues identify the correct pre-context mentioned above, but I believe medium severity is appropriate. Note for downgrade to low severity: Agree with above appeals and low severity, this is more of a status accounting error and does not have any impact, given the function of `closeBidOffer` is to withdraw the unused portion of sales proceeds. It can be executed as long as the TGE time has been reached, and it restricts the offer to be in a Virgin state. Since the statuses consistently do not utilize a switch from Vigin to Ongoing/Filled and the protocol can function appropriately even without the use of such statuses (presuming other bugs are fixed), the DoS impact will not occur.

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