The advertised value in the documentation for the offer status variable is not the one implemented in the DeliveryPlace::closeBidOffer
function.
In the DeliveryPlace::closeBidOffer
function, the documentation specifies that OfferStatus
must have the value Settling
, however the revert condition is applied to the Virgin
.
The status of the offer will change directly from Virgin
to Settled
.
And if the status of the offer passed as a parameter in the DeliveryPlace::closeBidOffer
function is equal to Settling
, the offer will never be closed because the function will always revert.
Manual Analysis.
Change code function as follows:
Based on the current Tadle market system, the `Settling` status is never used (along with `Ongoing` and `Filled`), which is supposed to represent the state before settlement by original maker. While sementically, the `Virgin` status does not represent the correct phase to allow early closures before settlement, this issue does not have any current impact given technically the early closure of bid offers is still allowed. However, if we are basing it off of the correct status implementation (i.e. `Settling` phase appropriately updated when takers create offers), then the DoS will occur, essentially blocking any early closure of bids by subsequent makers, forcing them to follow through to final settlement. Unfortunately, none of these issues identify the correct pre-context mentioned above, but I believe medium severity is appropriate. Note for downgrade to low severity: Agree with above appeals and low severity, this is more of a status accounting error and does not have any impact, given the function of `closeBidOffer` is to withdraw the unused portion of sales proceeds. It can be executed as long as the TGE time has been reached, and it restricts the offer to be in a Virgin state. Since the statuses consistently do not utilize a switch from Vigin to Ongoing/Filled and the protocol can function appropriately even without the use of such statuses (presuming other bugs are fixed), the DoS impact will not occur.
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