The scaleAmount
function in the Helpers
contract contains an unchecked arithmetic operation that can lead to an overflow when scaling a large token amount with a small number of decimals. Specifically, the function multiplies a provided amount by a scale factor derived from the token's decimal precision. If the input amount is excessively large and the scale factor results in a value greater than the maximum limit for a uint256 (2^256 - 1), an overflow can occur, causing the function to return an incorrect value.
This vulnerability can be exploited by malicious actors who can manipulate input values, leading to erroneous calculations that may result in financial losses for users. Exploitation of this vulnerability could allow attackers to claim more tokens than intended, disrupt the integrity of financial transactions, or cause unintended behaviors in token handling.
Arithmetic Overflow: The line return amount * scaleFactor;
may produce a value greater than the maximum limit for a uint256
(2^256 - 1) if the amount
is sufficiently large and the scaleFactor
is high. In Solidity, multiplication of two large numbers without checks can lead to an overflow, resulting in an incorrect amount being returned.
Wraparound: If an overflow occurs, the resultant value may wrap around to zero or yield a negative number, severely impacting any dependent calculations.
Manipulated Input: An attacker can leverage this vulnerability by supplying a carefully chosen large amount
combined with a small decimals
value to force an overflow.
Affected Functionality: The vulnerability directly impacts any functionality that relies on the output of the scaleAmount
function, including:
Fee calculations for transactions.
Adjustments in the balances of users involved in the token economy.
Financial models relying on accurate token valuations.
To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need to:
Call the scaleAmount
function with a sufficiently large amount
and a low decimals
value (e.g., 0 or 1), increasing the likelihood of triggering an overflow.
Depending on how the output of this function is used elsewhere in the contract, the attacker could manipulate the token economy, adversely affecting other users and the contract's integrity.
run this command to test the foundry test below: forge test --match-path tests/testname.t.sol -vvvv
Proof Of Concept:
The test result should be:
The test was designed to expect a revert when an overflow occurs, signifying that the function should safeguard against such situations.
Since the test did not revert as expected (indicating an overflow), it shows a failure in the implementation's defensive programming. This confirms that the existing logic does not adequately protect against arithmetic issues.
Incorrect Financial Calculations:
The scaleAmount
function is responsible for converting amounts from token decimals to a fixed-point representation with 18 decimals. An overflow in this function could result in incorrect amounts being calculated. This could lead to:
Underpayment or Overpayment: Users might receive less or more than intended, affecting trust and usability.
Mismanagement of Funds: Funds could be misallocated, leading to potential financial losses for users and the platform.
Loss of Funds:
If the function were to return a very high value due to overflow, this could result in excessive withdrawals or transfers being processed.
Attackers could exploit this vulnerability to withdraw funds beyond their entitlement, leading to direct financial losses for the contract and its users.
Use SafeMath Libraries:
Implement SafeMath or similar libraries that provide safe arithmetic operations with built-in overflow and underflow checks. In Solidity versions 0.8 and above, overflow checks are inherent to the language, but it’s essential to ensure that all arithmetic operations comply with the latest standards.
Input Validation:
Ensure that inputs to functions are validated before performing arithmetic operations. For instance, checking the range of amount
and decimals
before proceeding with calculations can help avoid unintended overflows or underflows.
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.