QuantAMM

Summary

The current implementation of UpdateWeightRunner introduces a critical vulnerability in the protocol. If the quantammAdmin modifies the UpdateWeightRunner, it could lead to unexpected behavior where the protocol breaks. Specifically:

1. A new UpdateWeightRunner might have a different quantammAdmin, which would not align with the existing Pool.

2. The rule required by the new UpdateWeightRunner is not set because the rule is defined during the Pool initialization phase.

This issue creates inconsistencies in the protocol, potentially leading to a denial of service (DoS) for affected pools.

Vulnerability Details

The vulnerability arises when the UpdateWeightRunner is changed, causing critical issues:

1. Admin Ownership Mismatch: The new UpdateWeightRunner may have a different quantAdmin, leading to conflicting authority and governance inconsistencies.

2. Missing Rules: The pool’s rules, set during initialization, are not carried over to the new UpdateWeightRunner. This prevents updates, effectively causing a denial-of-service (DoS) for the pool.

Proof of Concept (POC)

Add the following test to QuantAMMWeightedPool2TokenTest to simulate the issue:

Initialization of the New UpdateWeightRunner:

POC Test Case:

Impact

Changing the UpdateWeightRunner leads to the following issues:

1. Denial of Service (DoS):
   The new UpdateWeightRunner does not inherit the rule for the existing pool, rendering it non-functional.

2. Unauthorized Updates:
   The quantAdmin of the initial UpdateWeightRunner can update the pool with the new UpdateWeightRunner, creating further inconsistencies.

These flaws disrupt the protocol and can lead to operational outages or malicious misuse.

Tools Used

Manual review

Recommendations

To address this vulnerability, update the setUpdateWeightRunnerAddress function to synchronize quantammAdmin and ensure the rule is correctly set during the update. Modify the function as follows:

Updated Code