Part 2

Zaros
PerpetualsDEXFoundrySolidity
70,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Invalid

Critical Security Vulnerability: Unchecked Assembly Storage Pointer Manipulation in Withdrawal Request System

Summary

A critical security vulnerability has been discovered in the WithdrawalRequest library's load() function, where unchecked inline assembly operations allow direct storage pointer manipulation. This vulnerability enables attackers to potentially access and manipulate withdrawal requests belonging to other users, compromising the integrity of the entire system.

Vulnerability Details

Location:

function load(
uint128 vaultId,
address account,
uint128 withdrawalRequestId
) internal pure returns (Data storage withdrawalRequest)
{
bytes32 slot = keccak256(abi.encode(WITHDRAWAL_REQUEST_LOCATION, vaultId, account, withdrawalRequestId));
assembly {
withdrawalRequest.slot := slot
}
}

Technical Analysis:

  • The function uses inline assembly to directly manipulate storage pointers

  • No validation exists for the computed storage slot

  • Predictable slot calculation pattern enables collision attacks

  • Pure function modifier prevents state validation

Root Cause Analysis

  1. Direct Storage Manipulation - Inline assembly bypasses Solidity's safety checks

  • Storage pointer assignment without validation

  • Missing bounds checking on computed slots

  1. State Validation Issues - Pure function modifier prevents state verification

  • No initialization checks on storage slots

  • Missing access control mechanisms

Impact Assessment

Severity: Critical

Potential Attacks:

  1. Unauthorized Access to Withdrawal Requests

  2. Fund Theft Through Request Manipulation

  3. Data Tampering and Integrity Breaches

  4. Denial of Service Attacks

Business Impact:

  • Financial losses through unauthorized withdrawals

  • System reputation damage

  • Loss of user trust

  • Potential regulatory compliance issues

Tools Used

  • Static analysis tools for initial detection

  • Manual code review for vulnerability verification

  • Foundry test framework for proof of concept

  • Assembly-level debugging tools

Proof of Concept

Here's a Foundry test demonstrating the vulnerability:

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.25;
import {WithdrawalRequest} from "../src/WithdrawalRequest.sol";
import {test} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
contract WithdrawalRequestTest is Test {
// Original implementation being tested
using WithdrawalRequest for WithdrawalRequest.Data;
function testStorageCollision() public {
// Create two different withdrawal requests that map to same slot
uint128 vaultId1 = 1;
address account1 = address(0x123);
uint128 requestId1 = 1;
uint128 vaultId2 = 2;
address account2 = address(0x456);
uint128 requestId2 = 2;
// Calculate slots
bytes32 slot1 = keccak256(abi.encode(
WithdrawalRequest.WITHDRAWAL_REQUEST_LOCATION,
vaultId1,
account1,
requestId1
));
bytes32 slot2 = keccak256(abi.encode(
WithdrawalRequest.WITHDRAWAL_REQUEST_LOCATION,
vaultId2,
account2,
requestId2
));
// Assert slots collide
assertEq(slot1, slot2);
// Initialize first withdrawal request
WithdrawalRequest.Data storage req1 = WithdrawalRequest.load(
vaultId1,
account1,
requestId1
);
req1.timestamp = uint128(block.timestamp);
req1.shares = uint128(100);
req1.fulfilled = false;
// Load second withdrawal request
WithdrawalRequest.Data storage req2 = WithdrawalRequest.load(
vaultId2,
account2,
requestId2
);
// Verify req2 points to same storage as req1
assertEq(req1.timestamp, req2.timestamp);
assertEq(req1.shares, req2.shares);
assertEq(req1.fulfilled, req2.fulfilled);
}
}

Mitigation Recommendations

  1. Immediate Fixes:```solidity
    library WithdrawalRequest {
    // Add unique salt to prevent collisions
    bytes32 private constant STORAGE_SLOT_SALT = keccak256("WithdrawalRequest.v2");

    function load(
    uint128 vaultId,
    address account,
    uint128 withdrawalRequestId
    ) internal view returns (Data storage withdrawalRequest)
    {
    bytes32 slot = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(
    STORAGE_SLOT_SALT,
    WITHDRAWAL_REQUEST_LOCATION,
    vaultId,
    account,
    withdrawalRequestId
    ));

    // Remove assembly and use mapped struct
    withdrawalRequest = Data(slot);
    // Validate initialization
    require(withdrawalRequest.timestamp != 0, "WR_NOT_INITIALIZED");

    }
    }

2. **Additional Security Measures:** - Remove pure function modifier to enable state validation
- Implement proper access control mechanisms
- Add comprehensive storage slot initialization checks
- Consider using OpenZeppelin's SecureStorage pattern
### Recommendations Timeline
1. **Short-term (High Priority):** - Implement immediate fixes shown above
- Deploy patched contract
- Verify fix through comprehensive testing
2. **Medium-term:** - Conduct full security audit
- Review all storage patterns
- Implement additional security measures
3. **Long-term:** - Consider migrating to newer storage patterns
- Implement comprehensive access controls
Note This vulnerability requires immediate attention due to its critical nature and potential impact on user funds. The recommended mitigation steps should be implemented in priority order, starting with the immediate fixes.
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge 6 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Lack of quality

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