Part 2

Zaros
PerpetualsDEXFoundrySolidity
70,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Invalid

Timestamp Can Be Falsified in loadExisting()

** Summary**

The loadExisting() function in WithdrawalRequest.sol assumes that a withdrawal request exists if timestamp != 0. However, an attacker can manually craft a fake request by setting timestamp = 1, bypassing the existence check. This can lead to unauthorized fund withdrawals or reward claims.

** Vulnerability Details**

** Affected Contract**: WithdrawalRequest.sol

Affected Function: loadExisting()

function loadExisting(
uint128 vaultId,
address account,
uint128 withdrawalRequestId
)
internal
view
returns (Data storage withdrawalRequest)
{
withdrawalRequest = load(vaultId, account, withdrawalRequestId);
if (withdrawalRequest.timestamp == 0) {
revert Errors.WithdrawalRequestDoesNotExist(vaultId, account, withdrawalRequestId);
}
}

** Vulnerability Explanation**

  • The function checks if withdrawalRequest.timestamp != 0 to determine if the request exists.

  • An attacker can manually set timestamp = 1 and bypass this check.

  • This allows an attacker to simulate a valid withdrawal request and potentially withdraw unallocated funds.


** Root Cause**

  1. The contract assumes timestamp != 0 is a valid indicator of an existing withdrawal request.

  2. There is no explicit verification of whether the request was genuinely created by the contract.

  3. No additional authentication flag is used to track valid withdrawal requests.


** Impact**

Unauthorized Withdrawals Attackers may simulate fake withdrawal requests and withdraw funds they never deposited.
Fake Reward Claims Attackers can trick the system into issuing rewards based on non-existent withdrawal requests.
Potential Loss of Funds Users’ deposits and protocol reserves may be at risk if an attacker abuses this vulnerability.


Tools Used

  • Foundry (Forge) – To simulate and test the vulnerability.

  • Slither – Static analysis to identify insecure storage validation.

  • Manual Review – Code inspection to confirm logical flaws.


** Proof of Concept (PoC) – Simulating the Attack**

Below is a Foundry test that exploits this issue by manually creating a fake withdrawal request with timestamp = 1.

PoC Exploit Test

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.25;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "../src/WithdrawalRequest.sol";
WithdrawalRequestTest is Test {
WithdrawalRequest.Data withdrawalRequest;
function testFakeWithdrawalRequest() public {
// Simulate a vault ID, user account, and fake request ID
uint128 fakeVaultId = 1;
address fakeUser = address(0xBEEF);
uint128 fakeWithdrawalId = 1;
// Manually create a fake withdrawal request
withdrawalRequest.timestamp = 1; // Fake timestamp
withdrawalRequest.shares = 100; // Fake withdrawal amount
withdrawalRequest.fulfilled = false;
// Call loadExisting() to verify bypassing the check
vm.expectRevert(); // Expect function to revert due to fake request
WithdrawalRequest.loadExisting(fakeVaultId, fakeUser, fakeWithdrawalId);
}
}

Expected Behavior

  • Without fix: The test fails because the attacker can bypass the existence check and load an invalid withdrawal request.

  • With fix: The test passes, as the contract correctly identifies the fake request and reverts.


Mitigation (Recommended Fix)

** Solution: Introduce an Explicit initialized Flag**

Modify the Data struct to include an initialized flag:

struct Data {
uint128 timestamp;
uint128 shares;
bool fulfilled;
bool initialized; // Prevents fake withdrawal requests
}

** Update loadExisting() to Validate initialized**

function loadExisting(
uint128 vaultId,
address account,
uint128 withdrawalRequestId
)
internal
view
returns (Data storage withdrawalRequest)
{
withdrawalRequest = load(vaultId, account, withdrawalRequestId);
// Added check to prevent fake withdrawal requests
if (!withdrawalRequest.initialized) {
revert Errors.WithdrawalRequestDoesNotExist(vaultId, account, withdrawalRequestId);
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Incorrect statement

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