DeFiFoundry
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

The `setCallbackGasLimit` function does not validate `_callbackGasLimit`

Summary

The setCallbackGasLimit function does not validate these values, allowing the Owner to set _callbackGasLimit to any value.

Vulnerability Details

The setCallbackGasLimit function, Owner can set _callbackGasLimit = 0 or set _callbackGasLimit too large.

  • If _callbackGasLimit = 0 causing the callback to fail. The contract calling the callback will get an "Out of Gas" error, causing the transaction to revert.

  • If _callbackGasLimit too large, callbacks may not need to use up the large amount of gas provided, resulting in wasted gas costs.

function setCallbackGasLimit(uint256 _callbackGasLimit) external onlyOwner {
callbackGasLimit = _callbackGasLimit;
}

Impact

Affects contract callback actions or wastes gas costs.

Tools Used

Manual

Recommendations

Add validate _callbackGasLimit

if (_callbackGasLimit == 0) {
revert Error.WrongValue();
}
if (_callbackGasLimit > 20000000) {
revert Error.WrongValue();
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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