Submission Details
Severity:
Potential for Fee Type Overflow on FeeCollector.sol
Summary
The feeTypes mapping assumes that the FeeType struct fits within the specified 100% distribution, but there is no explicit check in place to ensure that the sum of the veRAACShare, burnShare, repairShare, and treasuryShare equals 100%. If this is not enforced, the contract could experience overflow or unintended behavior.
Vulnerability Details
feeTypes[0] = FeeType({
veRAACShare: 8000, // 80%
burnShare: 0,
repairShare: 0,
treasuryShare: 2000 // 20%
});
Impact
Incorrect fee distributions could occur, leading to potential mismanagement of protocol funds.
Tools Used
Recommendations
Enforce a validation check to ensure that the sum of the shares always equals 100% (or 10,000 basis points).
if (newFee.veRAACShare + newFee.burnShare + newFee.repairShare + newFee.treasuryShare != BASIS_POINTS) {
revert InvalidDistributionParams();
}
Updates
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77,280 USDC
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3,86420 USDC / LOC
74,000
3,280
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