Submission Details
Severity:
MAX_TOTAL_SUPPLY is wrongly checked when user locks in veRAACToken
Summary
Max total supply is wrongly checked when user locks in veRAACToken.
Vulnerability Details
When a user calls lock() to a new lock position for RAAC tokens, protocol checks if the total supply of veRAAC token will be larger than MAX_TOTAL_SUPPLY after the lock.
@> if (totalSupply() + amount > MAX_TOTAL_SUPPLY) revert TotalSupplyLimitExceeded();
...
// Calculate initial voting power
@> (int128 bias, int128 slope) = _votingState.calculateAndUpdatePower(
msg.sender,
amount,
unlockTime
);
// Update checkpoints
@> uint256 newPower = uint256(uint128(bias));
...
// Mint veTokens
@> _mint(msg.sender, newPower);
Protocol uses the RAAC token amount to check against veRAAC token's total supply, this is wrong because the acutal minted veRAAC token depends on the lock duration, and the minted veRAAC token amount does not necessarily equals to the RAAC token amount transferred in.
This can be seen in VotingPowerLib::calculateAndUpdatePower():
VotingPowerLib::calculateAndUpdatePower()
uint256 duration = unlockTime - block.timestamp;
uint256 initialPower = (amount * duration) / MAX_LOCK_DURATION; // Normalize by max duration
bias = int128(int256(initialPower));
Impact
Lock transaction can be wrongly blocked.
POC
Please run forge test --mt testAudit_veRaacTokenTotalSupply.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
import {Test, console, stdError} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/transparent/TransparentUpgradeableProxy.sol";
import "../contracts/libraries/math/WadRayMath.sol";
import "../contracts/core/pools/LendingPool/LendingPool.sol";
import "../contracts/core/pools/StabilityPool/StabilityPool.sol";
import "../contracts/mocks/core/tokens/crvUSDToken.sol";
import "../contracts/core/tokens/RToken.sol";
import "../contracts/core/tokens/DebtToken.sol";
import "../contracts/core/tokens/DeToken.sol";
import "../contracts/core/tokens/RAACToken.sol";
import "../contracts/core/tokens/RAACNFT.sol";
import "../contracts/core/tokens/veRAACToken.sol";
import "../contracts/core/primitives/RAACHousePrices.sol";
import "../contracts/core/minters/RAACMinter/RAACMinter.sol";
import "../contracts/core/collectors/FeeCollector.sol";
import "../contracts/core/collectors/Treasury.sol";
contract Audit is Test {
using WadRayMath for uint256;
using SafeCast for uint256;
address owner = makeAddr("Owner");
address repairFund = makeAddr("RepairFund");
LendingPool lendingPool;
StabilityPool stabilityPool;
RAACHousePrices raacHousePrices;
crvUSDToken crvUSD;
RToken rToken;
DebtToken debtToken;
DEToken deToken;
RAACToken raacToken;
RAACNFT raacNft;
veRAACToken veRaacToken;
RAACMinter raacMinter;
FeeCollector feeCollector;
Treasury treasury;
function setUp() public {
vm.warp(1 days);
raacHousePrices = new RAACHousePrices(owner);
// Deploy tokens
raacToken = new RAACToken(owner, 100, 50);
veRaacToken = new veRAACToken(address(raacToken));
crvUSD = new crvUSDToken(owner);
rToken = new RToken("RToken", "RToken", owner, address(crvUSD));
debtToken = new DebtToken("DebtToken", "DT", owner);
raacNft = new RAACNFT(address(crvUSD), address(raacHousePrices), owner);
deToken = new DEToken("DEToken", "DEToken", owner, address(rToken));
// Deploy Treasury and FeeCollector
treasury = new Treasury(owner);
feeCollector = new FeeCollector(
address(raacToken),
address(veRaacToken),
address(treasury),
repairFund,
owner
);
// Deploy LendingPool
lendingPool = new LendingPool(
address(crvUSD),
address(rToken),
address(debtToken),
address(raacNft),
address(raacHousePrices),
0.1e27
);
lendingPool.transferOwnership(owner);
// Deploy stabilityPool Proxy
bytes memory data = abi.encodeWithSelector(
StabilityPool.initialize.selector,
address(rToken),
address(deToken),
address(raacToken),
address(owner),
address(crvUSD),
address(lendingPool)
);
address stabilityPoolProxy = address(
new TransparentUpgradeableProxy(
address(new StabilityPool(owner)),
owner,
data
)
);
stabilityPool = StabilityPool(stabilityPoolProxy);
// RAACMinter
raacMinter = new RAACMinter(
address(raacToken),
address(stabilityPool),
address(lendingPool),
owner
);
// Initialization
vm.startPrank(owner);
raacHousePrices.setOracle(owner);
rToken.setReservePool(address(lendingPool));
debtToken.setReservePool(address(lendingPool));
deToken.setStabilityPool(address(stabilityPool));
stabilityPool.setRAACMinter(address(raacMinter));
lendingPool.setStabilityPool(address(stabilityPool));
raacToken.setMinter(address(raacMinter));
raacToken.setFeeCollector(address(feeCollector));
raacToken.manageWhitelist(address(feeCollector), true);
raacToken.manageWhitelist(address(raacMinter), true);
raacToken.manageWhitelist(address(stabilityPool), true);
raacToken.manageWhitelist(address(veRaacToken), true);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.label(address(crvUSD), "crvUSD");
vm.label(address(rToken), "RToken");
vm.label(address(debtToken), "DebtToken");
vm.label(address(deToken), "DEToken");
vm.label(address(raacToken), "RAACToken");
vm.label(address(raacNft), "RAAC NFT");
vm.label(address(lendingPool), "LendingPool");
vm.label(address(stabilityPool), "StabilityPool");
vm.label(address(raacMinter), "RAACMinter");
vm.label(address(veRaacToken), "veRAAC");
vm.label(address(feeCollector), "FeeCollector");
vm.label(address(treasury), "Treasury");
vm.label(repairFund, "RepairFund");
}
function testAudit_veRaacTokenTotalSupply() public {
address alice = makeAddr("Alice");
deal(address(raacToken), alice, 110_000_000e18); // 110M
vm.startPrank(alice);
raacToken.approve(address(veRaacToken), 110_000_000e18);
for (uint i; i < 10; ++i) {
if (i == 9) {
veRaacToken.lock(10_000_000e18, 730 days);
continue;
}
veRaacToken.lock(10_000_000e18, 1460 days);
}
vm.stopPrank();
// Total supply is 95M
assertEq(veRaacToken.totalSupply(), 95_000_000e18);
// Alice tries to lock 10M for 730 days, the expected mint amount is 50M, and the total supply won't be surpassed
// However, the transaction is wrongly reverted
vm.prank(alice);
vm.expectRevert(IveRAACToken.TotalSupplyLimitExceeded.selector);
veRaacToken.lock(10_000_000e18, 730 days);
}
}
Tools Used
Manual Revew
Recommendations
Perform the check after the lock.
function lock(uint256 amount, uint256 duration) external nonReentrant whenNotPaused {
...
- if (totalSupply() + amount > MAX_TOTAL_SUPPLY) revert TotalSupplyLimitExceeded();
...
// Mint veTokens
_mint(msg.sender, newPower);
+ if (totalSupply() > MAX_TOTAL_SUPPLY) revert TotalSupplyLimitExceeded();
emit LockCreated(msg.sender, amount, unlockTime);
}
Updates
Lead Judging Commences
inallhonesty 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published Assigned finding tags:
Incorrect `MAX_TOTAL_SUPPLY` check in the `veRAACToken::lock/extend` function of `veRAACToken` could harm locking functionality
Prize pool breakdown
Total prize
77,280 USDC
nSLOC
3,86420
USDC / LOC
74,000
3,280
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