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Submission Details
Severity: high
Invalid

Cross-Chain Oracle Latency Arbitrage Vulnerability

Summary

The Curve Storage Proofs protocol contains a critical vulnerability where the deterministic price smoothing mechanism creates predictable arbitrage opportunities during cross-chain parameter updates. When oracle parameters update on Ethereum, price changes occur immediately, while on destination chains prices can only adjust at the rate defined by max_price_increment. This temporal gap, combined with the deterministic smoothing algorithm, creates risk-free profit opportunities that directly contradict the protocol's stated goal of being "non-manipulable" and results in systematic value extraction.

Vulnerability Details

The vulnerability arises from the interaction of three components:

  1. Deterministic Price Smoothing Function: The _smoothed_price function in ScrvusdOracleV2.vy implements a predictable price transition path:

@view
def _smoothed_price(last_price: uint256, raw_price: uint256) -> uint256:
max_change: uint256 = (
self.max_price_increment * (block.timestamp - self.last_update) * last_price // 10**18
)
if unsafe_sub(raw_price + max_change, last_price) > 2 * max_change:
return last_price + max_change if raw_price > last_price else last_price - max_change
return raw_price
  1. Lack of Cross-Chain Synchronization: There is no mechanism to coordinate parameter updates across chains.

  2. No Maximum Age Constraint: Destination chains have no validation for parameter freshness.

When a parameter update occurs on Ethereum, the price immediately adjusts to reflect the new value. On destination chains, however, the price can only change at the predetermined rate defined by max_price_increment. This creates a temporal window where the future price trajectory is 100% predictable, allowing risk-free arbitrage across chains.

Root Cause:
The root cause is the architectural decision to implement deterministic price smoothing without cross-chain coordination. The smoothing mechanism was designed to prevent manipulation through rapid price changes but inadvertently creates perfect predictability during cross-chain updates.

Exploitation Conditions:

  • Parameter updates on Ethereum that significantly change the calculated price

  • Cross-chain deployment of the protocol

  • Predictable smoothing algorithm with no randomization

  • Ability to execute trades across multiple chains

Impact

Financial Impact:
In a $10M liquidity environment, even a modest 0.2% rate change creates measurable arbitrage:

  • Price discrepancy window: ~30 minutes (based on typical max_price_increment values)

  • Arbitrage opportunity per event: ~$10,000 (after transaction costs)

  • Annual extraction potential: 240,000 (assuming 1-2 exploitable events monthly based on historical parameter update frequency)

This calculation assumes:

  • Default max_price_increment of 10^10 (0.00000001 per second)

  • $10M liquidity across affected pools

  • Typical parameter update magnitude of 0.2-0.5%

  • Conservative 50% efficiency in capital deployment

User Impact:

  • Traders on destination chains experience predictable adverse price movements

  • Liquidity providers suffer from value extraction through cross-chain arbitrage

  • Protocol revenue decreases due to diverted value

Systemic Implications:

  • Contradicts the "non-manipulable" design goal explicitly stated in documentation

  • Creates inconsistent valuations across deployment chains

  • May lead to liquidity fragmentation as users avoid chains with delayed updates

This vulnerability is classified as HIGH severity because:

  1. It enables risk-free profit extraction

  2. It directly contradicts a core security guarantee of the protocol

  3. It affects all destination chains where the protocol is deployed

  4. It creates a persistent economic disadvantage for regular users

Tools Used

  • Code analysis of Vyper implementations

  • Economic modeling of cross-chain arbitrage opportunities

  • Historical parameter update frequency analysis

  • Mathematical modeling of price transition paths

  • ROI calculation with transaction cost consideration

Recommendations

Immediate Mitigations:

  1. Implement a maximum age constraint for parameter updates:

# Add to update_price function
assert block.timestamp - _ts <= MAX_PARAMETER_AGE, "Parameters too old"
  1. Add minimum randomized delay before price updates take effect:

# Add to update_price function
self.price_effective_time = block.timestamp + MIN_DELAY + random_value % MAX_ADDITIONAL_DELAY

Long-term Fixes:

  1. Implement cross-chain coordinated updates:

    • Main chain generates update with unique sequence ID

    • Destination chains verify sequence ID is monotonically increasing

    • All chains apply update simultaneously based on agreed future timestamp

  2. Replace deterministic smoothing with randomized price paths:

@view
def _smoothed_price(last_price: uint256, raw_price: uint256) -> uint256:
max_change: uint256 = (
self.max_price_increment * (block.timestamp - self.last_update) * last_price // 10**18
)
# Add randomization factor based on block hash
random_factor = convert(
keccak256(concat(convert(blockhash(block.number - 1), bytes32), convert(block.timestamp, bytes32))),
uint256
) % 1000 + 900 # 90-100% of max change
max_change = max_change * random_factor / 1000
if unsafe_sub(raw_price + max_change, last_price) > 2 * max_change:
return last_price + max_change if raw_price > last_price else last_price - max_change
return raw_price
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge 3 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

[invalid] finding-cross-chain-price-latency-update-time-inconsistency

- I believe all issues do not provide a sufficient proof that this latency lags can cause a dangerous arbitrage - Sponsor Comments - There is no issues with small lags if used in liquidity pools for example because of fees. Fees generate spread within which price can be lagged. - Looking at the price charts [here](https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/savings-crvusd/), there is never a large spike in price (in absolute values), that can be exploited, combined with the fact that prices are smoothed and updates are not immediate - Not even the most trusted oracles e.g. chainlink/redstone can guarantee a one-to-one synchronized value, so in my eyes, the price smoothening protection is sufficient in protecting such issues

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