Summary

The _extractParametersFromProof function applies an unnecessary keccak256 hash to all PARAM_SLOTS[i] values when extracting storage slot data. This double hashing affects all parameters (params[0] to params[6]), including literal slots (e.g., 21 for total_debt) and the calculated slot for balanceOf(self). As a result, all extracted values are likely incorrect, disrupting the data passed to SCRVUSD_ORACLE for price updates.

Vulnerability Details

In the function _extractParametersFromProof:

• The function hashes each PARAM_SLOTS[i] value with keccak256(abi.encode(...)) before passing it to extractSlotValueFromProof.

• For literal slots (e.g., PARAM_SLOTS[1] = 21 for total_debt):

Expected: Slot 21 should be used directly to fetch total_debt.

Actual: keccak256(abi.encode(21)) is used, which points to an unrelated slot.

• For the computed slot (PARAM_SLOTS[7] = keccak256(abi.encode(18, SCRVUSD))):

Expected: A precomputed slot like keccak256(abi.encode(SCRVUSD, 18)) should be used directly.

Actual: keccak256(abi.encode(keccak256(abi.encode(18, SCRVUSD)))) is used, further deviating from the correct slot.

This affects all extracted params values (total_debt, total_idle, totalSupply, etc ).

Impact

1. Data Corruption: All params values (params[0] to params[6]) passed to SCRVUSD_ORACLE are incorrect, likely breaking the oracle’s ability to compute accurate prices or validate state.

2. Financial Risk: If SCRVUSD is a token contract and the oracle relies on these parameters (e.g., totalSupply, total_debt) for pricing or liquidity, this could lead to significant financial miscalculations or exploitable errors.

Tools Used

• Manual code review

Recommendations

Fix the logic: Remove the extra keccak256 hash to use PARAM_SLOTS[i] directly