Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

✅ Unsafe cast of `PuppyRaffle::fee` loses fees

Root + Impact: Unsafe cast of PuppyRaffle::fee loses fees

Description

In `PuppyRaffle::selectWinner` their is a type cast of a `uint256` to a `uint64`. This is an unsafe cast, and if the `uint256` is larger than `type(uint64).max`, the value will be truncated.
```javascript
function selectWinner() external {
require(block.timestamp >= raffleStartTime + raffleDuration, "PuppyRaffle: Raffle not over");
require(players.length > 0, "PuppyRaffle: No players in raffle");
uint256 winnerIndex = uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, block.timestamp, block.difficulty))) % players.length;
address winner = players[winnerIndex];
uint256 fee = totalFees / 10;
uint256 winnings = address(this).balance - fee;
@> totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
players = new address[](0);
emit RaffleWinner(winner, winnings);
}
```
The max value of a `uint64` is `18446744073709551615`. In terms of ETH, this is only ~`18` ETH. Meaning, if more than 18ETH of fees are collected, the `fee` casting will truncate the value.

Risk

Impact:

This means the `feeAddress` will not collect the correct amount of fees, leaving fees permanently stuck in the contract.

Proof of Concept

1. A raffle proceeds with a little more than 18 ETH worth of fees collected
2. The line that casts the `fee` as a `uint64` hits
3. `totalFees` is incorrectly updated with a lower amount
You can replicate this in foundry's chisel by running the following:
```javascript
uint256 max = type(uint64).max
uint256 fee = max + 1
uint64(fee)
// prints 0
```

Recommended Mitigation

Set `PuppyRaffle::totalFees` to a `uint256` instead of a `uint64`, and remove the casting. Their is a comment which says:
```javascript
// We do some storage packing to save gas
```
But the potential gas saved isn't worth it if we have to recast and this bug exists.
```diff
- uint64 public totalFees = 0;
+ uint256 public totalFees = 0;
.
.
.
function selectWinner() external {
require(block.timestamp >= raffleStartTime + raffleDuration, "PuppyRaffle: Raffle not over");
require(players.length >= 4, "PuppyRaffle: Need at least 4 players");
uint256 winnerIndex =
uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, block.timestamp, block.difficulty))) % players.length;
address winner = players[winnerIndex];
uint256 totalAmountCollected = players.length * entranceFee;
uint256 prizePool = (totalAmountCollected * 80) / 100;
uint256 fee = (totalAmountCollected * 20) / 100;
- totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
+ totalFees = totalFees + fee;
```
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-05] Typecasting from uint256 to uint64 in PuppyRaffle.selectWinner() May Lead to Overflow and Incorrect Fee Calculation

## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.

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