Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

# [H-1] Denial of Service (DoS) in PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle due to quadratic gas cost growth in duplicate checks

[H-1] Denial of Service (DoS) in PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle due to quadratic gas cost growth in duplicate checks

Description

The PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle function performs a duplicate check by iterating through the entire players array for every new entrant. As the number of players increases, the gas cost to add new players grows quadratically (). Eventually, the gas required will exceed the block gas limit, causing the function to revert and permanently blocking new users from entering the raffle.

Vulnerability Details

In the enterRaffle function, the contract attempts to ensure unique entrants by looping through the players array.

// @audit-issue Nested loop causes quadratic gas growth
for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
}
}

This logic creates a significant scaling issue. For every new player added, the contract must compare it against every existing player.

  • 100th player: Cheap to check.

  • 10,000th player: Must perform ~10,000 comparisons.

This results in an Out of Gas error once the array size hits a certain threshold, causing a Denial of Service.

Risk

High. The core functionality of the protocol (enterRaffle) becomes unusable.

  • New users cannot enter the raffle.

  • The protocol fails to scale.

  • If the raffle relies on ticket sales to fund the prize, the pot will be capped prematurely.

Proof of Concept

The following test demonstrates how gas costs increase non-linearly as the players array grows.

Click to view Foundry Test
function test_GasCostProgression() public {
uint256[] memory playerCounts = new uint256[](5);
playerCounts[0] = 10;
playerCounts[1] = 20;
playerCounts[2] = 30;
playerCounts[3] = 50;
playerCounts[4] = 100;
for (uint256 idx = 0; idx < playerCounts.length; idx++) {
uint256 count = playerCounts[idx];
// Create unique players
address[] memory players = new address[](count);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < count; i++) {
players[i] = address(uint160(idx * 1000 + i + 10000));
}
uint256 gasBefore = gasleft();
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * count}(players);
uint256 gasUsed = gasBefore - gasleft();
// Formula for Combinations: n * (n-1) / 2
uint256 expectedComparisons = (count * (count - 1)) / 2;
console.log("=== Player Count:", count, "===");
console.log("Gas used:", gasUsed);
console.log("Gas per player:", gasUsed / count); // Notice this increases!
}
}

Recommended Mitigation

  1. Remove the nested loop duplicate check.

  2. On-chain duplicate checks for "Sybil resistance" are generally ineffective because a user can simply generate multiple wallet addresses.

  3. If unique addresses are strictly required, use a mapping for constant time lookup instead of an array loop.

// Proposed Fix: Use a mapping
mapping(address => bool) public hasEntered;
function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable {
require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "Incorrect ETH sent");
for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
require(!hasEntered[newPlayers[i]], "Duplicate player");
hasEntered[newPlayers[i]] = true;
players.push(newPlayers[i]);
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 2 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `PuppyRaffle: enterRaffle` Use of gas extensive duplicate check leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than prev ones to enter

## Description `enterRaffle` function uses gas inefficient duplicate check that causes leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than previous users to enter. ## Vulnerability Details In the `enterRaffle` function, to check duplicates, it loops through the `players` array. As the `player` array grows, it will make more checks, which leads the later user to pay more gas than the earlier one. More users in the Raffle, more checks a user have to make leads to pay more gas. ## Impact As the arrays grows significantly over time, it will make the function unusable due to block gas limit. This is not a fair approach and lead to bad user experience. ## POC In existing test suit, add this test to see the difference b/w gas for users. once added run `forge test --match-test testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient -vvvvv` in terminal. you will be able to see logs in terminal. ```solidity function testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient() public { vm.startPrank(owner); vm.txGasPrice(1); /// First we enter 100 participants uint256 firstBatch = 100; address[] memory firstBatchPlayers = new address[](firstBatch); for(uint256 i = 0; i < firstBatchPlayers; i++) { firstBatch[i] = address(i); } uint256 gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * firstBatch}(firstBatchPlayers); uint256 gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForFirstBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 partipants is:", gasUsedForFirstBatch); /// Now we enter 100 more participants uint256 secondBatch = 200; address[] memory secondBatchPlayers = new address[](secondBatch); for(uint256 i = 100; i < secondBatchPlayers; i++) { secondBatch[i] = address(i); } gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * secondBatch}(secondBatchPlayers); gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForSecondBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the next 100 participant is:", gasUsedForSecondBatch); vm.stopPrank(owner); } ``` ## Recommendations Here are some of recommendations, any one of that can be used to mitigate this risk. 1. User a mapping to check duplicates. For this approach you to declare a variable `uint256 raffleID`, that way each raffle will have unique id. Add a mapping from player address to raffle id to keep of users for particular round. ```diff + uint256 public raffleID; + mapping (address => uint256) public usersToRaffleId; . . function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); + usersToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = true; } // Check for duplicates + for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++){ + require(usersToRaffleId[i] != raffleID, "PuppyRaffle: Already a participant"); - for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { - for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { - require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); - } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } . . . function selectWinner() external { //Existing code + raffleID = raffleID + 1; } ``` 2. Allow duplicates participants, As technically you can't stop people participants more than once. As players can use new address to enter. ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```

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