Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

totalFees uint64 overflow and unsafe cast permanently lock protocol fees in withdrawFees()

Root + Impact

Description

selectWinner() accumulates 20% protocol fees into totalFees, and withdrawFees() later pays them to feeAddress.

The contract is compiled with Solidity ^0.7.6, which has no built-in overflow checks, and totalFees is a uint64 (max ~18.44 ETH in wei). Two defects: uint64(fee) silently truncates when a round's fee exceeds type(uint64).max, and totalFees + uint64(fee) wraps once accumulated fees pass type(uint64).max.

@> totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);

After a wrap, withdrawFees()'s strict check can never hold again, so accrued fees become permanently unwithdrawable:

@> require(address(this).balance == uint256(totalFees), "PuppyRaffle: There are currently players active!");

Risk

Likelihood: Medium

  • Triggers naturally after enough rounds accumulate, or immediately with a sufficiently large entranceFee.

Impact: High

  • Protocol fee accounting is corrupted and the fees become permanently locked (frozen funds).

Proof of Concept

With entranceFee and player counts whose cumulative fee exceeds 2^64 - 1 wei (~18.45 ETH), totalFees wraps to a small value. The contract's real ETH balance no longer equals totalFees, so every subsequent withdrawFees() reverts with "There are currently players active!", locking the fees forever.

Recommended Mitigation

Use uint256 for totalFees, compile with Solidity >= 0.8 (checked arithmetic), and drop the unsafe cast.

- uint64 public totalFees = 0;
+ uint256 public totalFees = 0;
...
- totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
+ totalFees = totalFees + fee;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 22 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-05] Typecasting from uint256 to uint64 in PuppyRaffle.selectWinner() May Lead to Overflow and Incorrect Fee Calculation

## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.

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