Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Unbounded O(n^2) duplicate check in enterRaffle() enables denial of service

Root + Impact

Description

enterRaffle() appends the new players and then validates uniqueness with a nested O(n^2) loop over the entire players array.

As players grows, the duplicate-check gas cost grows quadratically. Early entrants pay little; later entrants pay progressively more, and eventually a single enterRaffle call exceeds the block gas limit so no one can enter — a denial of service. An attacker can also pre-bloat the array to lock everyone else out.

@> for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
@> for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
}
}

Risk

Likelihood: Medium

  • Occurs naturally as participation grows; an attacker can deliberately bloat the array up front to grief later entrants.

Impact: Medium

  • Entries eventually revert (raffle unusable); gas costs are unfairly distributed and the protocol is griefable.

Proof of Concept

This Foundry test shows the second batch of 100 entrants costs dramatically more gas than the first (quadratic growth):

function test_enterRaffleDoS() public {
address[] memory first = new address[](100);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < 100; i++) first[i] = address(uint160(i + 1));
uint256 gasA = gasleft();
raffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * 100}(first);
uint256 costA = gasA - gasleft();
address[] memory second = new address[](100);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < 100; i++) second[i] = address(uint160(i + 101));
uint256 gasB = gasleft();
raffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * 100}(second);
uint256 costB = gasB - gasleft();
assert(costB > costA); // second batch far more expensive
}

Extrapolated, entries eventually exceed the block gas limit and permanently revert.

Recommended Mitigation

Replace the nested loop with O(1) membership tracking keyed by a per-raffle id:

+ mapping(address => uint256) public addressToRaffleId;
+ uint256 public raffleId = 0;
function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable {
require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "...");
for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
players.push(newPlayers[i]);
+ require(addressToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] != raffleId, "Duplicate player");
+ addressToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = raffleId;
}
- for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
- for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
- require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
- }
- }
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 22 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `PuppyRaffle: enterRaffle` Use of gas extensive duplicate check leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than prev ones to enter

## Description `enterRaffle` function uses gas inefficient duplicate check that causes leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than previous users to enter. ## Vulnerability Details In the `enterRaffle` function, to check duplicates, it loops through the `players` array. As the `player` array grows, it will make more checks, which leads the later user to pay more gas than the earlier one. More users in the Raffle, more checks a user have to make leads to pay more gas. ## Impact As the arrays grows significantly over time, it will make the function unusable due to block gas limit. This is not a fair approach and lead to bad user experience. ## POC In existing test suit, add this test to see the difference b/w gas for users. once added run `forge test --match-test testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient -vvvvv` in terminal. you will be able to see logs in terminal. ```solidity function testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient() public { vm.startPrank(owner); vm.txGasPrice(1); /// First we enter 100 participants uint256 firstBatch = 100; address[] memory firstBatchPlayers = new address[](firstBatch); for(uint256 i = 0; i < firstBatchPlayers; i++) { firstBatch[i] = address(i); } uint256 gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * firstBatch}(firstBatchPlayers); uint256 gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForFirstBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 partipants is:", gasUsedForFirstBatch); /// Now we enter 100 more participants uint256 secondBatch = 200; address[] memory secondBatchPlayers = new address[](secondBatch); for(uint256 i = 100; i < secondBatchPlayers; i++) { secondBatch[i] = address(i); } gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * secondBatch}(secondBatchPlayers); gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForSecondBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the next 100 participant is:", gasUsedForSecondBatch); vm.stopPrank(owner); } ``` ## Recommendations Here are some of recommendations, any one of that can be used to mitigate this risk. 1. User a mapping to check duplicates. For this approach you to declare a variable `uint256 raffleID`, that way each raffle will have unique id. Add a mapping from player address to raffle id to keep of users for particular round. ```diff + uint256 public raffleID; + mapping (address => uint256) public usersToRaffleId; . . function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); + usersToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = true; } // Check for duplicates + for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++){ + require(usersToRaffleId[i] != raffleID, "PuppyRaffle: Already a participant"); - for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { - for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { - require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); - } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } . . . function selectWinner() external { //Existing code + raffleID = raffleID + 1; } ``` 2. Allow duplicates participants, As technically you can't stop people participants more than once. As players can use new address to enter. ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```

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