Normally, each selectWinner call should credit 20% of the round's funds to totalFees, so withdrawFees can later pay the fee address exactly what was collected.
totalFees is a uint64 and the contract is compiled with Solidity 0.7.6, which has no built-in overflow checks. totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee) truncates fee when it exceeds type(uint64).max (~18.45 ETH) and can also overflow on accumulation. Either way totalFees stops matching the real fees, permanently corrupting fee accounting.
Likelihood:
Happens in any round where the 20% fee exceeds ~18.45 ETH (e.g., 100 players at a 1 ETH entrance fee = 20 ETH fee), since the uint64 cast truncates the value.
Happens cumulatively as totalFees grows across rounds and wraps past type(uint64).max.
Impact:
Fees are under-counted and effectively lost; the gap between the real fee and the truncated totalFees becomes unwithdrawable.
Because withdrawFees requires address(this).balance == uint256(totalFees), once they diverge fee withdrawal reverts permanently.
Foundry test: 100 players at a 1 ETH entrance fee make the 20% fee = 20 ETH, exceeding uint64 max. After selectWinner, totalFees records only ~1.55 ETH instead of 20 ETH — ~18.45 ETH lost.
Use uint256 for totalFees and a checked compiler (>=0.8) or SafeMath; never downcast fee amounts.
## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.
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