Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

O(n^2) duplicate check in enterRaffle enables denial of service / griefing

Root + Impact

Description

  • Normally, entering via enterRaffle should cost roughly the same gas regardless of how many players already entered.

  • enterRaffle checks for duplicates with a nested loop over the entire players array, so its cost grows quadratically (O(n²)) with the number of existing players. As the array grows, each new entry costs more gas, and eventually entering exceeds the block gas limit, blocking all further entries. A griefer can also front-load many entries to price out later participants.

function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable {
require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "...");
for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); }
@> for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { // O(n^2) over whole array
@> for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
@> require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
}
}
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Happens as the raffle fills up: each additional player makes the duplicate check iterate over a larger array, so later entrants pay rapidly increasing gas.

  • Happens deliberately when a griefer submits a large batch early, inflating players so subsequent entries become unaffordable or revert on the block gas limit.

Impact:

  • Later honest users are priced out or unable to enter at all — a denial of service on the core enterRaffle flow.

  • Early entrants gain an unfair, cheaper-entry advantage.

Proof of Concept

Foundry test measuring gas to enter when the array is empty vs. after ~100 players exist; the late entry costs more than 10x the first.

uint256 gasFirst = _enterOne(1); // empty array -> dup check doesn't loop
raffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * 100}(hundredPlayers); // pre-fill
uint256 gasLate = _enterOne(5000); // dup check now loops over ~101
assertGt(gasLate, gasFirst * 10); // gas blows up

Recommended Mitigation

Replace the O(n²) loop with an O(1) membership check using a mapping (clearing it on refund/reset):

+ mapping(address => bool) public isPlayer;
function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable {
require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "...");
for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
+ require(!isPlayer[newPlayers[i]], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
+ isPlayer[newPlayers[i]] = true;
players.push(newPlayers[i]);
}
- for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
- for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
- require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
- }
- }
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 16 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `PuppyRaffle: enterRaffle` Use of gas extensive duplicate check leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than prev ones to enter

## Description `enterRaffle` function uses gas inefficient duplicate check that causes leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than previous users to enter. ## Vulnerability Details In the `enterRaffle` function, to check duplicates, it loops through the `players` array. As the `player` array grows, it will make more checks, which leads the later user to pay more gas than the earlier one. More users in the Raffle, more checks a user have to make leads to pay more gas. ## Impact As the arrays grows significantly over time, it will make the function unusable due to block gas limit. This is not a fair approach and lead to bad user experience. ## POC In existing test suit, add this test to see the difference b/w gas for users. once added run `forge test --match-test testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient -vvvvv` in terminal. you will be able to see logs in terminal. ```solidity function testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient() public { vm.startPrank(owner); vm.txGasPrice(1); /// First we enter 100 participants uint256 firstBatch = 100; address[] memory firstBatchPlayers = new address[](firstBatch); for(uint256 i = 0; i < firstBatchPlayers; i++) { firstBatch[i] = address(i); } uint256 gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * firstBatch}(firstBatchPlayers); uint256 gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForFirstBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 partipants is:", gasUsedForFirstBatch); /// Now we enter 100 more participants uint256 secondBatch = 200; address[] memory secondBatchPlayers = new address[](secondBatch); for(uint256 i = 100; i < secondBatchPlayers; i++) { secondBatch[i] = address(i); } gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * secondBatch}(secondBatchPlayers); gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForSecondBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the next 100 participant is:", gasUsedForSecondBatch); vm.stopPrank(owner); } ``` ## Recommendations Here are some of recommendations, any one of that can be used to mitigate this risk. 1. User a mapping to check duplicates. For this approach you to declare a variable `uint256 raffleID`, that way each raffle will have unique id. Add a mapping from player address to raffle id to keep of users for particular round. ```diff + uint256 public raffleID; + mapping (address => uint256) public usersToRaffleId; . . function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); + usersToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = true; } // Check for duplicates + for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++){ + require(usersToRaffleId[i] != raffleID, "PuppyRaffle: Already a participant"); - for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { - for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { - require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); - } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } . . . function selectWinner() external { //Existing code + raffleID = raffleID + 1; } ``` 2. Allow duplicates participants, As technically you can't stop people participants more than once. As players can use new address to enter. ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```

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