[MEDIUM] M-2 selectWinner can crown a refunded hole
winnerIndex can land on an address(0) slot left by refund(): the prize is called to the zero address (burned) and _safeMint(address(0), tokenId) reverts ("ERC721: mint to the zero address"), DoS-ing the round even if M-1 were fixed.
Likelihood: Medium — any refund creates a zeroed slot that the winner draw can hit.
Impact: Medium — prize pool funds burned / round can never complete.
PoC: forced a hole landing, observed the revert.
Skip/compact zeroed slots before picking the winner.
## Description In the `selectWinner` function, when a player has refunded and their address is replaced with address(0), the prize money may be sent to address(0), resulting in fund loss. ## Vulnerability Details In the `refund` function if a user wants to refund his money then he will be given his money back and his address in the array will be replaced with `address(0)`. So lets say `Alice` entered in the raffle and later decided to refund her money then her address in the `player` array will be replaced with `address(0)`. And lets consider that her index in the array is `7th` so currently there is `address(0)` at `7th index`, so when `selectWinner` function will be called there isn't any kind of check that this 7th index can't be the winner so if this `7th` index will be declared as winner then all the prize will be sent to him which will actually lost as it will be sent to `address(0)` ## Impact Loss of funds if they are sent to address(0), posing a financial risk. ## Recommendations Implement additional checks in the `selectWinner` function to ensure that prize money is not sent to `address(0)`
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