Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

L-1 totalFees silently truncates on uint64 cast

Root + Impact

Description

[LOW] L-1 totalFees silently truncates on uint64 cast

totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);

Solidity 0.7.6 has no checked casts; a fee >= 2^64 wei (~18.4 ETH) silently truncates, corrupting fee accounting and potentially bricking withdrawFees (balance == totalFees can never hold again).

Risk

  • Likelihood: Low — requires an accumulated fee of ~18.4 ETH.

  • Impact: Low — fee accounting corrupted; fee withdrawal can be permanently bricked.

Proof of Concept

n/a — direct arithmetic consequence of the unchecked cast.

Recommended Mitigation

Remove the cast (use uint256 throughout) or guard the range explicitly.

- totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
+ totalFees = totalFees + fee;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-05] Typecasting from uint256 to uint64 in PuppyRaffle.selectWinner() May Lead to Overflow and Incorrect Fee Calculation

## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.

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