Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Present Purchases Burn 1 SANTA Instead of the Intended 2 SANTA Cost

Root + Impact

Description

PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST defines the intended price of one present as 2e18 SANTA. Users should burn exactly 2 SANTA to receive an additional NFT through buyPresent.

However, buyPresent does not use PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST. It calls SantaToken.burn, which always burns only 1e18 SANTA. As a result, users can purchase an NFT for half of the intended cost.

uint256 public constant PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST = 2e18;
function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external {
i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); // @> Burns only the fixed 1e18 amount.
_mintAndIncrement();
}
function burn(address from) external {
if (msg.sender != i_santasList) {
revert SantaToken__NotSantasList();
}
_burn(from, 1e18); // @> The declared 2e18 present cost is never enforced.
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Every successful buyPresent call burns only 1 SANTA because the burn amount is hard-coded.

  • EXTRA_NICE users receive SANTA through collectPresent and can use it to obtain additional NFTs.

Impact:

  • Additional NFTs are sold for 50% below the specified price.

  • The protocol’s intended SANTA-token economics and NFT redemption rules are undermined.

Proof of Concept

function testPoC_PresentCostsOneSantaInsteadOfTwo() public {
address buyer = makeAddr("buyer");
vm.startPrank(santa);
santasList.checkList(buyer, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
santasList.checkTwice(buyer, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
// Buyer receives one NFT and exactly 1 SANTA.
vm.prank(buyer);
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(buyer), 1e18);
// The declared price is 2 SANTA, but 1 SANTA buys another NFT.
vm.prank(buyer);
santasList.buyPresent(buyer);
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(buyer), 0);
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(buyer), 2);
assertEq(santasList.PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST(), 2e18);
}

Recommended Mitigation

Allow SantaToken.burn to receive an amount and enforce PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST in buyPresent.

function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external {
if (msg.sender != i_santasList) {
revert SantaToken__NotSantasList();
}
_burn(from, amount);
}
function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external {
i_santaToken.burn(msg.sender, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST);
_mintAndIncrement(presentReceiver);
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] Cost to buy NFT via SantasList::buyPresent is 2e18 SantaToken but it burns only 1e18 amount of SantaToken

## Description - The cost to buy NFT as mentioned in the docs is 2e18 via the `SantasList::buyPresent` function but in the actual implementation of buyPresent function it calls the SantaToken::burn function which doesn't take any parameter for amount and burns a fixed 1e18 amount of SantaToken, thus burning only half of the actual amount that needs to be burnt, and hence user can buy present for their friends at cheaper rates. - Along with this the user is able to buy present for themselves but the docs mentions that present can be bought only for other users. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability lies in the code in the function `SantasList::buyPresent` at line 173 and in `SantaToken::burn` at line 28. The function `burn` burns a fixed amount of 1e18 SantaToken whenever `buyPresent` is called but the true value of SantaToken that was expected to be burnt to mint an NFT as present is 2e18. ```cpp function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { @> i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); _mintAndIncrement(); } ``` ```cpp function burn(address from) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } @> _burn(from, 1e18); } ``` ## PoC Add the test in the file: `test/unit/SantasListTest.t.sol`. Run the test: ```cpp forge test --mt test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount ``` ```cpp function test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount() public { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks user once as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); // Santa checks user second time santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // christmas time 🌳🎁 HO-HO-HO vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME()); // user collects their present vm.prank(user); santasList.collectPresent(); // balance after collecting present uint256 userInitBalance = santaToken.balanceOf(user); // now the user holds 1e18 SantaToken assertEq(userInitBalance, 1e18); vm.prank(user); santaToken.approve(address(santasList), 1e18); vm.prank(user); // user buy present // docs mention that user should only buy present for others, but they can buy present for themselves santasList.buyPresent(user); // only 1e18 SantaToken is burnt instead of the true price (2e18) assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), userInitBalance - 1e18); } ``` ## Impact - Protocol mentions that user should be able to buy NFT for 2e18 amount of SantaToken but users can buy NFT for their friends by burning only 1e18 tokens instead of 2e18, thus NFT can be bought at much cheaper rate which is half of the true amount that was expected to buy NFT. - User can buy a present for themselves but docs strictly mentions that present can be bought for someone else. ## Recommendations Include an argument inside the `SantaToken::burn` to specify the amount of token to burn and also update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function with updated parameter for `burn` function to pass correct amount of tokens to burn. - Update the `SantaToken::burn` function ```diff -function burn(address from) external { +function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } - _burn(from, 1e18); + _burn(from, amount); } ``` - Update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function ```diff + error SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { + if (msg.sender == presentReceiver) { + revert SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); + } - i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); + i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST); _mintAndIncrement(); } ```

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