Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Deposit increases the exchange rate with unearned fees, making redemptions insolvent

Summary

Every deposit calls AssetToken.updateExchangeRate with a calculated flash-loan fee even though no fee was earned. The depositor receives shares at the old rate, then the rate is immediately increased without adding matching underlying. Their claim becomes larger than the pool's assets, so redemption reverts or consumes other LP funds.

Root cause and evidence

In ThunderLoan.deposit lines 147-155, mintAmount is calculated at the current rate and shares are minted. Lines 153-154 then calculate a fee from the deposit amount and raise the exchange rate. Only the requested deposit amount is transferred at line 155; the synthetic fee is never transferred.

redeem lines 169-177 multiplies shares by the inflated exchange rate and tries to transfer that larger amount. With a single depositor, the AssetToken lacks the excess underlying and the transfer reverts.

Impact

Liquidity providers cannot reliably redeem their deposits. With multiple depositors, early redeemers can withdraw unearned value backed by later users, causing insolvency and loss.

Minimal patch

Remove the fee calculation and updateExchangeRate call from deposit. Update the exchange rate only after a flash loan has actually been repaid and the fee is present in the AssetToken.

Regression test

Deposit into an empty pool and immediately redeem all minted AssetTokens. Assert the user receives exactly the deposit and the exchange rate is unchanged. Separately, execute a repaid flash loan and assert only the realized fee increases the rate.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 1 hour ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Updating exchange rate on token deposit will inflate asset token's exchange rate faster than expected

# Summary Exchange rate for asset token is updated on deposit. This means users can deposit (which will increase exchange rate), and then immediately withdraw more underlying tokens than they deposited. # Details Per documentation: > Liquidity providers can deposit assets into ThunderLoan and be given AssetTokens in return. **These AssetTokens gain interest over time depending on how often people take out flash loans!** Asset tokens gain interest when people take out flash loans with the underlying tokens. In current version of ThunderLoan, exchange rate is also updated when user deposits underlying tokens. This does not match with documentation and will end up causing exchange rate to increase on deposit. This will allow anyone who deposits to immediately withdraw and get more tokens back than they deposited. Underlying of any asset token can be completely drained in this manner. # Filename `src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol` # Permalinks https://github.com/Cyfrin/2023-11-Thunder-Loan/blob/8539c83865eb0d6149e4d70f37a35d9e72ac7404/src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol#L153-L154 # Impact Users can deposit and immediately withdraw more funds. Since exchange rate is increased on deposit, they will withdraw more funds then they deposited without any flash loans being taken at all. # Recommendations It is recommended to not update exchange rate on deposits and updated it only when flash loans are taken, as per documentation. ```diff function deposit(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external revertIfZero(amount) revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) { AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate(); uint256 mintAmount = (amount * assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION()) / exchangeRate; emit Deposit(msg.sender, token, amount); assetToken.mint(msg.sender, mintAmount); - uint256 calculatedFee = getCalculatedFee(token, amount); - assetToken.updateExchangeRate(calculatedFee); token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(assetToken), amount); } ``` # POC ```solidity function testExchangeRateUpdatedOnDeposit() public setAllowedToken { tokenA.mint(liquidityProvider, AMOUNT); tokenA.mint(user, AMOUNT); // deposit some tokenA into ThunderLoan vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider); tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), AMOUNT); thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, AMOUNT); vm.stopPrank(); // another user also makes a deposit vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), AMOUNT); thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, AMOUNT); vm.stopPrank(); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); // after a deposit, asset token's exchange rate has aleady increased // this is only supposed to happen when users take flash loans with underlying assertGt(assetToken.getExchangeRate(), 1 * assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION()); // now liquidityProvider withdraws and gets more back because exchange // rate is increased but no flash loans were taken out yet // repeatedly doing this could drain all underlying for any asset token vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider); thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, assetToken.balanceOf(liquidityProvider)); vm.stopPrank(); assertGt(tokenA.balanceOf(liquidityProvider), AMOUNT); } ```

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