Tadle

Tadle
DeFiFoundry
27,750 USDC
View results
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

settleAskMaker doesn't check for turbo mode

Summary

Offer listed with turbo mode doesn't require any collateral to be deposited so when an owner of a offer settles a ask offer then he shouldn't be eligible for any refund back but currently it is not checked so they receive collateral refund even when they deposit any in the first place.

Vulnerability Details

Following is settle ask maker function

function settleAskMaker(address _offer, uint256 _settledPoints) external {
(
OfferInfo memory offerInfo,
MakerInfo memory makerInfo,
MarketPlaceInfo memory marketPlaceInfo,
MarketPlaceStatus status
) = getOfferInfo(_offer);
if (_settledPoints > offerInfo.usedPoints) {
revert InvalidPoints();
}
if (marketPlaceInfo.fixedratio) {
revert FixedRatioUnsupported();
}
if (offerInfo.offerType == OfferType.Bid) {
revert InvalidOfferType(OfferType.Ask, OfferType.Bid);
}
if (
offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Virgin &&
offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Canceled
) {
revert InvalidOfferStatus();
}
if (status == MarketPlaceStatus.AskSettling) {
if (_msgSender() != offerInfo.authority) {
revert Errors.Unauthorized();
}
} else {
if (_msgSender() != owner()) {
revert Errors.Unauthorized();
}
if (_settledPoints > 0) {
revert InvalidPoints();
}
}
uint256 settledPointTokenAmount = marketPlaceInfo.tokenPerPoint *
_settledPoints;
ITokenManager tokenManager = tadleFactory.getTokenManager();
if (settledPointTokenAmount > 0) {
tokenManager.tillIn(
_msgSender(),
marketPlaceInfo.tokenAddress,
settledPointTokenAmount,
true
);
}
uint256 makerRefundAmount;
if (_settledPoints == offerInfo.usedPoints) {
if (offerInfo.offerStatus == OfferStatus.Virgin) {
makerRefundAmount = OfferLibraries.getDepositAmount(
offerInfo.offerType,
offerInfo.collateralRate,
offerInfo.amount,
true,
Math.Rounding.Floor
);
} else {
uint256 usedAmount = offerInfo.amount.mulDiv(
offerInfo.usedPoints,
offerInfo.points,
Math.Rounding.Floor
);
makerRefundAmount = OfferLibraries.getDepositAmount(
offerInfo.offerType,
offerInfo.collateralRate,
usedAmount,
true,
Math.Rounding.Floor
);
}
tokenManager.addTokenBalance(
TokenBalanceType.SalesRevenue,
_msgSender(),
makerInfo.tokenAddress,
makerRefundAmount
);
}
IPerMarkets perMarkets = tadleFactory.getPerMarkets();
perMarkets.settledAskOffer(
_offer,
_settledPoints,
settledPointTokenAmount
);
emit SettleAskMaker(
makerInfo.marketPlace,
offerInfo.maker,
_offer,
_msgSender(),
_settledPoints,
settledPointTokenAmount,
makerRefundAmount
);
}

Refund amount is calculated as follows

uint256 makerRefundAmount;
if (_settledPoints == offerInfo.usedPoints) {
if (offerInfo.offerStatus == OfferStatus.Virgin) {
makerRefundAmount = OfferLibraries.getDepositAmount(
offerInfo.offerType,
offerInfo.collateralRate,
offerInfo.amount,
true,
Math.Rounding.Floor
);
} else {
uint256 usedAmount = offerInfo.amount.mulDiv(
offerInfo.usedPoints,
offerInfo.points,
Math.Rounding.Floor
);
makerRefundAmount = OfferLibraries.getDepositAmount(
offerInfo.offerType,
offerInfo.collateralRate,
usedAmount,
true,
Math.Rounding.Floor
);
}
tokenManager.addTokenBalance(
TokenBalanceType.SalesRevenue,
_msgSender(),
makerInfo.tokenAddress,
makerRefundAmount
);
}

As can be seen that there is no check to prevent offer settle types of turbo mode for getting any maker refund back.

Impact

Maker in turbo mode get collateral refund even when they are not eligible to get that amount.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Introduce suitable checks for preventing any refund back for turbo mode instead of the original offer maker as initially collateral is submitted irrespective of the offer type.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge about 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-Premarkets-listOffer-turbo-settleAskMaker-exploit-settlement

Valid high severity, this allows resellers listing offers via `listOffer/relistOffer` to game the system. Based on the inherent design of Turbo mode not requiring takers making ask offers for the original maker offer to deposit collateral, the wrong refund of collateral to takers even when they did not deposit collateral due to turbo mode during settleAskMaker allows possible draining of pools.

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.