The approve
function, inside CapitalPool
lacks a validation check to ensure that only the token manager can call it.
In the approve function of the CapitalPool.sol contract, there is a missing require statement to verify that the caller is the designated token manager. Without this check, any address could potentially call the approve function, leading to unauthorized token approvals and possible security risks.
This missing check allows any address to invoke the approve function, which could result in tokens being approved for unintended addresses, thereby compromising the security of the contract.
Imagination
Add a require
statement to ensure that only the token manager can call the approve function, preventing unauthorized access and securing token approvals:
This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.
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