Submission Details
Severity:
Reentrancy in PreMarktes::createTaker function
Summary
Reentrancy in PreMarktes::createTaker function has a function _depositTokenWhenCreateTaker that implements state variables written after the call(s)
Vulnerability Details
function createTaker(address _offer, uint256 _points) external payable { //@audit
/**
* @dev offer must be virgin
* @dev points must be greater than 0
* @dev total points must be greater than used points plus _points
*/
if (_points == 0x0) {
revert Errors.AmountIsZero();
}
OfferInfo storage offerInfo = offerInfoMap[_offer];
MakerInfo storage makerInfo = makerInfoMap[offerInfo.maker];
if (offerInfo.offerStatus != OfferStatus.Virgin) {
revert InvalidOfferStatus();
}
if (offerInfo.points < _points + offerInfo.usedPoints) {
revert NotEnoughPoints(
offerInfo.points,
offerInfo.usedPoints,
_points
);
}
/// @dev market place must be online
ISystemConfig systemConfig = tadleFactory.getSystemConfig();
{
MarketPlaceInfo memory marketPlaceInfo = systemConfig
.getMarketPlaceInfo(makerInfo.marketPlace);
marketPlaceInfo.checkMarketPlaceStatus(
block.timestamp,
MarketPlaceStatus.Online
);
}
ReferralInfo memory referralInfo = systemConfig.getReferralInfo(
_msgSender()
);
uint256 platformFeeRate = systemConfig.getPlatformFeeRate(_msgSender());
/// @dev generate stock address
address stockAddr = GenerateAddress.generateStockAddress(offerId);
if (stockInfoMap[stockAddr].authority != address(0x0)) {
revert StockAlreadyExist();
}
/// @dev Transfer token from user to capital pool as collateral
uint256 depositAmount = _points.mulDiv(
offerInfo.amount,
offerInfo.points,
Math.Rounding.Ceil
);
uint256 platformFee = depositAmount.mulDiv(
platformFeeRate,
Constants.PLATFORM_FEE_DECIMAL_SCALER
);
uint256 tradeTax = depositAmount.mulDiv(
makerInfo.eachTradeTax,
Constants.EACH_TRADE_TAX_DECIMAL_SCALER
);
ITokenManager tokenManager = tadleFactory.getTokenManager();
@> _depositTokenWhenCreateTaker( //@audit
platformFee,
depositAmount,
tradeTax,
makerInfo,
offerInfo,
tokenManager
);
offerInfo.usedPoints = offerInfo.usedPoints + _points;
/// @dev update stock info
stockInfoMap[stockAddr] = StockInfo({
id: offerId,
stockStatus: StockStatus.Initialized,
stockType: offerInfo.offerType == OfferType.Ask
? StockType.Bid
: StockType.Ask,
authority: _msgSender(),
maker: offerInfo.maker,
preOffer: _offer,
points: _points,
amount: depositAmount,
offer: address(0x0)
});
offerId = offerId + 1;
uint256 remainingPlatformFee = _updateReferralBonus(
platformFee,
depositAmount,
stockAddr,
makerInfo,
referralInfo,
tokenManager
);
makerInfo.platformFee = makerInfo.platformFee + remainingPlatformFee;
_updateTokenBalanceWhenCreateTaker(
_offer,
tradeTax,
depositAmount,
offerInfo,
makerInfo,
tokenManager
);
/// @dev emit CreateTaker
emit CreateTaker(
_offer,
msg.sender,
stockAddr,
_points,
depositAmount,
tradeTax,
remainingPlatformFee
);
}
Impact
Exposes the protocol to reentrancy attack, making the protocol to lose assets
Tools Used
manual review
Recommendations
You can implement a reentrancy guard
Implement Check-Effects-Interactions (CEI) Pattern
Updates
Lead Judging Commences
0xnevi about 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published Reason: Lack of quality
Assigned finding tags:
[invalid] finding-PreMarkets-reentrancy
Invalid, all [vague generalities](https://docs.codehawks.com/hawks-auditors/how-to-determine-a-finding-validity#vague-generalities) talking about possible reentrancies 11and afaik, reentrancy is not possible and not proven.
Prize pool breakdown
Total prize
27,750 USDC
nSLOC
1,22923
USDC / LOC
25,000 USDC
2,750 USDC
2,250 USDC
Live
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
Appeals
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals Review
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.